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1. INTRODUCTION
David Hoffman (1784-1854) founded the Law Institute at
the University of Maryland,' authored in 1817 A Course of
Legal Study, the first methodical introduction to the study of
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. The author
thanks Dan Blinka, Al Brophy, Steve Sheppard, and Vincent Johnson, for their many
useful insights. The author also thanks his research assistant Lauren Valkenaar, and Brian
Detweiler, who found many of the documents cited in this essay.
1. See History & Mission, UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/mission.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
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American law,2 successfully practiced law in Baltimore,3 and in
1836 wrote the first maxims of legal ethics, Fifty Resolutions in
Regard to Professional Deportment ("Resolutions").4 Yet when
a two-volume history of the Maryland bench and bar was
published in 1901, Hoffman was ignored.s After disappearing
for over a century, American lawyers and legal scholars
rediscovered Hoffinan. Since the late 1970s, Hoffman has been
regularly and favorably cited as a guide to overcoming ethical
woes in the American legal profession. 6
How and why was David Hoffman "lost" to American law
for over a century, and why was he was then "found"? Hoffman
was lost because his view of ethics was premised on virtue,
specifically the concept of honor, an ideal that was fading even
as he wrote. A gentleman was accorded honor by the public
based on its perception that his actions were right. Actions
falling below the standard of public morality were therefore
dishonorable. Thus, "[w]hat is morally wrong, cannot be
professionally right, however it may be sanctioned by time or
2. See generally DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY; RESPECTFULLY
ADDRESSED TO THE STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Baltimore, Coale &
Maxwell 1817) [hereinafter HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1817].
3. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffnan and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1979).
4. See generally 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO
STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 752-775 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed.
1836) [hereinafter HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836]. For more on David Hoffman and his
contribution to the field of legal ethics, see Thomas L. Shaffer, David Hoffinan's Law
School Lectures, 1822-1833, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1982); Francis S. Philbrick,
Hoffman, David, in 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 111, 111-12 (Dumas
Malone ed. 1932); David Hoffnan: A Biographical Sketch, in DAVID HOFFMAN: LIFE,
LETTERS AND LECTURES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, 1821-1837, at 13, 13-41
(Bill Sleeman ed. 2011) [hereinafter HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS, AND LECTURES]; Howard
Schwerber, Hoffman, David, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW
267, 267-68 (Roger K. Newman ed. 2009).
5. See generally CONWAY W. SAMS & ELIHU S. RILEY, THE BENCH AND BAR OF
MARYLAND: A HISTORY 1634 TO 1901 (1901) (discussing the history of the legal
profession in Maryland, but failing to mention David Hoffman). Hoffman also went
unmentioned in the copious BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF
MARYLAND AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Baltimore, National Biographical Publishing
Co. 1879) and GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
AMERICA (William Draper Lewis ed. 1907). When the American Bar Association adopted
its Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, the organization noted Hoffman's contribution
but announced that its work was derived from the later work of Pennsylvania Judge George
Sharswood. See Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, 33 A.B.A. REP. 3, 56 (1908).
6. See, e.g., Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 343, 350-51 (2008).
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custom." 7  Hoffman's aristocratic belief system was being
displaced in an emerging age of individualism, one in which
public honor was supplanted by private conscience.8
Writing in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville noted, "in ages
of equality, every man finds his beliefs within himself, and ...
all his feelings are turned in on himself."9 Ralph Waldo
Emerson wrote in his journal that the 1820s was "the age of the
first person singular."10 In this era of individualism, private
interests were primary. Whether a lawyer behaved ethically
became a test of private conscience, not public honor." This
transition was accompanied by a second shift, one in which
lawyers accepted that legal ethics differed from public
morality. 12  The foremost duty of a lawyer was to serve his
client's private interests, and the lawyer was not morally
accountable to the public for the client's goals.' 3 These shifts to
liberalism left Hoffman behind. Hoffman was so forgotten that
when his Resolutions were reprinted in 1953, legal historian
Arthur Sutherland commented that it was "a document which
7. HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 765 (Resolution XXXIII).
8. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 477 (J. P. Mayer & Max
Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966) (noting the rise of "individualism," coined by
Tocqueville and discussing relation between individualism and democratic society);
LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE
AMERICAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 6-13 (1989) (discussing the rise of the
modern American, the "inner-directed individual," and "the transition from a society based
on tradition to a society based on an ethic of individualism").
9. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8, at 477. He also opined, "[e]ach man is forever
thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in the solitude of
his own heart." Id. at 478.
10. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, MAKING THE AMERICAN SELF: JONATHAN EDWARDS
To ABRAHAM LINCOLN 107 (2009) (quoting 1827 journal entry).
11. See T. Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success, 1 W. L.J. 542, 547
(1844) (urging lawyers to act so that each may "stand justified at the bar of [his] own
conscience, whatever others may think of [his] conduct"); The Practice of the Bar, 9
MONTHLY L. REP. 27, 27 (1846) (asking "to be delivered from self-styled conscientious
lawyers, who will engage for no parties that are not morally right").
12. See JOHN T. BROOKE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ITS MORAL NATURE, AND
PRACTICAL CONNECTION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 15 (Cincinnati, H.W. Darby & Company
1849) ("The question then is, can a conscientious man, in view of this law of love, bind
himself by an oath, to execute, as a judge, a system of laws, which, although on the whole,
wise and good, will occasionally, incidentally and unavoidably, conflict with the moral
rights of individuals?").
13. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND
DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 23-26 (Philadelphia, T. & JW. Johnson 1854).
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should be more widely known."l 4 Hoffman's legal ethics were
largely unknown because they ran contrary to the dominant ethic
of lawyer behavior.
Hoffman was found in response to a moral crisis within the
American legal profession. By the late 1970s, many lawyers
feared that the liberal ideal of the lawyer as a zealous agent for a
client ignored the lawyer's duties to society.'" This crisis was
exacerbated by two events: (1) Watergate, in which lawyers
blindly followed the demands of their client-the President-to
society's detriment;' 6 and (2) the decision by the American Bar
Association to replace its 1969 Code of Professional
Responsibility, because the Code embraced the "fiction" that
ethical issues were "matters of ethics rather than law."' 7
One criticism of the ABA's 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was its emphasis that a lawyer's ethical
duty was almost wholly to one's client.' 8  Some critics
concluded the new Model Rules created an ethic of "winning at
all costs" and encouraged "Rambo-style litigation tactics,"
14. Arthur E. Sutherland, Conduct of Judges and Lawyers & Legal Ethics, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 147, 151 (1954) (book review). In fact, many historians dismissed
Hoffman. In one of the first books on the history of American law, James Willard Hurst
discussed legal ethics in depth, but he never mentioned Hoffman. See generally JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950). Hurst
does, however, mention Sharswood's contribution to legal ethics. See id. at 329. Although
Hoffman received prominent coverage in Perry Miller's The Life of the Mind in America:
From the Revolution to the Civil War, Hoffman essentially remained lost because Miller
ignored his work on legal ethics. See PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 158-59, 182 (1966).
15. See generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (explicating the liberal defense of
the lawyer as an agent of the client).
16. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 674 (2000) ("[E]thics instruction might have helped some of the
other lawyers, such as Egil Krogh .... [He] was so overawed by the prestige and power of
the Presidency that his conscience was lulled to rest .... ); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS
AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 35 (1978)
("More than twenty-five lawyers were formally named as defendants or co-conspirators in
Watergate and related criminal proceedings."); see also David R. Brink, Who Will Regulate
the Bar?, 61 A.B.A. J. 936, 937 (1975) ("[I1f Watergate has not tarnished the image of
lawyers, at least it has acutely intensified public consciousness of questions of legal ethics
and professional accountability.").
17. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63
A.B.A. J. 639, 639 (1977).
18. Cf Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken": An Instant History of the Battle Over
Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 262-65 (2009) (detailing the
history of protecting client confidences over the interests of others).
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decried by many in the late 1980s. 19 An important reaction to
this crisis in professionalism and morality was the promotion of
an ethic of lawyerly virtue.2 0 Because Hoffman concluded a
lawyer's duty to a client was limited by his duties to society, he
has served since the late 1970s as an example of an historical
ethic contrary to the standard conception of liberal neutrality in
representing clients. 2 1
Part II of this article discusses Hoffman's Resolutions in
light of the antebellum history of Baltimore, as well as
Hoffman's professional career and personal fortunes. Part III
traces the disappearance of Hoffman in legal ethics debates from
the mid-nineteenth century through the first seven decades of the
twentieth century. Lastly, Part IV provides a historical context
for the revival of Hoffman's Resolutions, particularly the
transformation of the American legal profession beginning in the
1970s.
19. FIRST BLOOD was released in 1982 and starred Sylvester Stallone as John
Rambo, a Vietnam War veteran evading capture by any means necessary. FIRST BLOOD
(Anabasis N.V., Elcajo Productions 1982). The sequel, RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II,
was released in 1985 and made three times the domestic revenue as the original. Rambo:
First Blood Part II, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0089880/?ref -ttrectt (last
visited Sept. 18, 2014). The success of these films led to lawyers calling "winning at all
costs" behavior "Rambo-style litigation." See John J. Curtin, Jr., A Message From the
President: Civil Matters, 77 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 8, 8 (discussing the Seventh Circuit
report on Rambo-style litigation tactics and noting he had addressed the issue seven years
earlier as chair of the ABA Litigation Section); Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators:
Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637 (1990) (decrying
"unfair tactics and intimidation" and promoting an effort to discourage the "Rambo"
attitude); see also Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 78, 79. The "hired gun" served as a metaphor for zealous
advocacy. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS,
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 16-18 (1994); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 166 (1988) ("[T]he role of [the] legal hired gun is morally
untenable.").
20. See Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 38, 40 (David Luban ed. 1983);
William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 WiS. L. REv. 29, 31 (1978).
21. See LUBAN, supra note 19, at xx (concluding the standard conception allowed a
lawyer to exhibit "extreme partisan zeal on behalf of the client" absent "moral
responsibility for the client's goals or the means used to attain them"). See generally
David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1986) (suggesting lawyers should be held morally responsible for the
goals of their clients); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 63 (1980) (advocating for a new standard of ethics in the legal profession
with lawyers taking responsibility for their professional conduct).
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II. BALTIMORE AND THE HISTORY OF HOFFMAN'S
RESOLUTIONS
David Hoffman was born in 1784, the youngest son in a
family of twelve children. 2 2 By then his father Peter, a German
immigrant, had moved the family from Frederick, Maryland to
Baltimore and opened a dry goods business.2 3 His timing was
excellent-the newly formed United States needed goods to
supply its army.2 4 Baltimore was not occupied by the British,
and its merchants made substantial profits during the
Revolutionary War.25 Peter Hoffman later opened Peter
Hoffman & Sons, a trading business with offices in Baltimore
and London.26 Its rise was rapid, and the Hoffman family
became one of the leading merchant families of Baltimore.
The Hoffmans were one of "a cluster of families [that]
emerged ... as the unchallenged leaders of Baltimore's
aristocracy." 2 8 David Hoffman was raised as a member of the
social and economic elite, which had replaced the traditional
Maryland planter aristocracy.
When Hoffman became a member of the Maryland bar in
the early nineteenth century, he joined a relatively small, but
rapidly growing, legal community in Baltimore. 29  Baltimore
lawyers came from the city's aristocracy, but the expansion in
the number of lawyers did not signify that any "corresponding
democratization of personnel or mores took place." 30 Lawyers
and merchants constituted a "conservative republicanism,"31
believing that elites were to govern for the benefit of society.
22. BALTIMORE: PAST AND PRESENT WITH BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF ITS
REPRESENTATIVE MEN 295 (Baltimore, Richardson & Bennett 1871).
23. Id. at 295-96.
24. See Frank A. Cassell, The Structure of Baltimore's Politics in the Age of
Jefferson, 1795-1812, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND 277, 278
(Aubrey C. Land et al. eds., 1977).
25. Id.
26. See BALTIMORE: PAST AND PRESENT WITH BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF ITS
REPRESENTATIVE MEN, supra note 22, at 295-96.
27. GARY LAWSON BROWNE, BALTIMORE IN THE NATION, 1789-1861, at 12 (1980).
28. Id.; see also WHITMAN H. RIDGWAY, COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP IN MARYLAND,
1790-1840: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POWER IN SOCIETY 222 (1979) (noting Peter
Hoffinan's inclusion in the decisional elite and his influence in Baltimore).
29. The number of lawyers in Baltimore increased from sixteen to forty-three
between 1799 and 1810. Bloomfield, supra note 3, at 677.
30. Id.
31. See CHARLES G. STEFFEN, THE MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE: WORKERS AND
POLITICS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1763-1812, at xiii (1984).
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Baltimore lawyers were almost always considered gentlemen
due to Maryland's stringent statutory requirements to become a
lawyer.32 The 1817-1818 Baltimore Directory listed David
Hoffman among a group of just forty attorneys. Five years
later, he was one of fifty-four. 3 4  This was a small, elite group
for the third-largest city in the nation with a population of more
than 62,000 people by 1820.35
Hoffman's Resolutions were published in the second
edition of A Course ofLegal Study in 1836.36 They are, in part,
a response to the end of conservative republicanism in
Maryland. Hoffman's published diatribes against Andrew
Jackson reflect his rearguard action to reclaim the place of the
gentleman aristocrat.3 7  Initial attacks on aristocratic rule in
Maryland helped precipitate the transformative 1812 Baltimore
Riot.3 8 By the early 1830s, Hoffman concluded that his position
at the University of Maryland was untenable. 39 Soon thereafter,
he suffered great personal loss when his only son died.40 In
32. See Dennis R. Nolan, The Effect of the Revolution on the Bar: The Maryland
Experience, 62 VA. L. REV. 969, 993 (1976) ("One other factor which may have helped
keep the bar's reputation intact was Maryland's continued insistence on three years of law
study under the supervision of a practicing attorney and an examination for fitness prior to
admission to the bar."); 1 SAMS & RILEY, supra note 5, at 245-46 (noting 1831 statutory
changes to eligibility for admission to the bar). A few exceptions apparently existed. See
WILBUR HARVEY HUNTER, A BALTIMORE LAW FIRM: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HINKLEY
AND SINGLEY AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1817-1967, at 9 (1967) (noting arrival of Edward
Hinkley in Baltimore "about 1815" and his admission to the bar on March 25, 1817, just
two years later).
33. THE BALTIMORE DIRECTORY FOR 1817-18 passim (Baltimore, James Kennedy
1817). The author thanks Brian Detweiler for compiling the list of attorneys from the
Baltimore Directory.
34. C. KEENAN'S BALTIMORE DIRECTORY FOR 1822 & 1823 passim (Baltimore, R.
J. Matchett 1822). This directory also listed seven judges in the Baltimore legal
community. Id.
35. History: 1820 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/throughthe_decades/fastfacts/1820_fastfacts.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
36. See HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 752-75.
37. See infra Part H.E.
38. See Paul A. Gilje, The Baltimore Riots of 1812 and the Breakdown of the Anglo-
American Mob Tradition, 13 J. SOC. HIST. 547, 547-48 (1980) [hereinafter Gilje, Baltimore
Riots]; see also PAUL A. GILuE, RIOTING IN AMERICA 60-63 (1996); Paul A. Gilje, "Le
Menu Peuple" in America: Identifying the Mob in the Baltimore Riots of 1812, MD. HIST.
MAG., Spring 1986, at 50, 50-51; STEFFEN, supra note 31, at 243-50; Frank A. Cassell, The
Great Baltimore Riot of 1812, MD. HIST. MAG., Fall 1975, at 241, 241.
39. David Hoffman: A Biographical Sketch, supra note 4, at 18, 36 ("Hoffman had
announced his intention to close the Law Institute and leave the University.").
40. Id. 36-37.
2014] 577
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:571
1835, Baltimore went through its wrenching Bank Riot, which
confirmed Hoffman's dark view of the baleful consequences of
Jacksonian democracy.41 Hoffman's interest in his legal
practice also appeared to dwindle after 1830.42 Together, these
personal and professional circumstances influenced Hoffman's
Resolutions.
A. Baltimore 1790-1812
Baltimore was a small, provincial town when the United
States declared independence. 43  In part because it was
unoccupied during the Revolutionary War, the city's merchants
"made immense profits fulfilling government contracts" for
military provisions.44 The first census in 1790 listed 13,503
persons in Baltimore, which almost doubled to 26,514 by 1800
and increased to 46,555 by 18 10.45 Baltimore embraced a
variety of peoples, creating a society "new, raw, and constantly
in flux." 46 Divisions in society were apparent early and were
exacerbated by the rise of a two-party system-the ascendant
Jeffersonian Republicans and the aristocratic Federalists-in
Baltimore by the end of the eighteenth century.47
In 1796, the Maryland legislature granted corporate status
to Baltimore, which gave the city its first powers of self-
48governance.48 Though this grant would eventually benefit
skilled craftsmen and tradesmen working in the city, the shift in
Baltimore's legal status was not accompanied by a social shift.
49
41. See generally ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, THE BALTIMORE BANK RIOT: POLITICAL
UPHEAVAL IN ANTEBELLUM MARYLAND (2009) (providing a comprehensive overview of
the political ideologies connected with the Baltimore Bank Riot). On riots in American
cities during this time, see MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE TURBULENT ERA: RIOT & DISORDER
IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1980), which focuses on the Philadelphia Native American
Riots of 1844. See also LEONARD L. RICHARDS, "GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND
STANDING": ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1970) (discussing the
anti-abolition of slavery movement by Northerners in the 1830s).
42. See David Hoffman: A Biographical Sketch, supra note 4, at 37.
43. See Cassell, supra note 24, at 278.
44. Id.
45. MD. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, POPULATION OF MARYLAND: BALTIMORE
CITY AND COUNTIES, 1790-1949, at 29 (1949).
46. Cassell, supra note 24, at 278.
47. See id. ("It is not surprising, therefore, that as the ... influential families that
composed the plantation interest drifted into the Federalist party in the 1790s, there was a
natural predisposition in Baltimore to embrace Republicanism.").
48. BROWNE, supra note 27, at 34.
49. See id. at 34-35.
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Instead, "society was the status elite," an exclusive group,
largely consisting of merchants and lawyers, that controlled the
politics of the city in its early days."o The composition of the
political elite changed over the first decade of Baltimore's
corporate existence as the social status of the representatives in
the city council changed. Jeffersonian Republicans eventually
dominated the municipal administration, and those Republicans
were more often tradesmen and mechanics than lawyers.5 1
Republican representatives "used democratic rhetoric to gain
support for their own goals," which mercantile and professional
elites found anathema.52 But even as political representation
changed, merchants, lawyers, and other professionals remained
the occupational groups with the largest wealth in Baltimore
during the first two decades of the nineteenth century.53 They
also continued to possess significant social authority. 54
In mid-1807, a British frigate attacked the warship
Chesapeake, impressed four sailors, and hobbled the ship." At
about the same time, a grand jury indicted Aaron Burr in
Virginia for treason, and news of both events reached Baltimore
on the same day.5 In Republican Baltimore, the attack on the
Chesapeake confirmed the majority's allegiance to President
Jefferson and Republicans.57 In the fall, Luther Martin returned
to Baltimore after successfully defending Burr in his treason
trial.5 Part of Martin's defense of Burr included a steady
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id. at 43.
52. Id For an overview of Baltimore's political development from 1795 to 1812,
see Cassell, supra note 24.
53. See STEFFEN, supra note 31, at 16 (listing the mean wealth of Baltimore
occupations in 1804 and 1815).
54. See RIDGWAY, supra note 28, at 95 ("Members of first families continued to be
political leaders and to hold political offices, as did leading merchants, but in the 1820s
others who appealed to the increasingly diverse urban constituency rose to positions of
power and influence.").
55. Cassell, supra note 24, at 289.
56. Id at 290. Two years earlier, Luther Martin represented Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase, a Federalist, in his Senate impeachment trial. See generally WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL
CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992). On Martin, see Edward S. Delaplaine,
Martin, Luther, in 12 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 343, 343-45 (Dumas
Malone ed. 1933); Gregory A. Stiverson, Martin, Luther, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 4, at 364, 364-65, and BILL KAUFFMAN,
FORGOTTEN FOUNDER, DRUNKEN PROPHET: THE LIFE OF LUTHER MARTIN (2008).
57. See Cassell, supra note 24, at 290.
58. See Delaplaine, supra note 56, at 343-45.
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invective against Thomas Jefferson, who Martin accused of
acting like the hated King George III.5 9 Upon his return, Martin
immediately renewed his attack on Jefferson. 6 0 He proceeded to
defend the conduct of Chief Justice and Federalist John Marshall
in a notice in the Federalist press.61 Martin declared:
We have proved . .. that in America there are lawyers who
cannot be intimidated by fear of presidential vengeance, nor
by the phrenzy of a deceived, misguided people, from
securing even to those destined to be the victims of power,
those rights for the enjoyment of which the constitution is
and ought to be their sacred honor and inviolate pledge.62
Martin's statements were accurately perceived by Baltimore
Republicans as directly attacking Jefferson, and a riot ensued.63
Disputes between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans
in Baltimore intensified, and by 1808, journeymen mechanics
became more militant.64 Federalists were aghast at the tarring
and feathering of an Anglophile shop foreman named Robert
Beatty by several members of a shoemakers' society, and
members of the Union Society of Journeymen Cordwainers (the
"Union") were indicted for conspiracy the next year.6 5
Republicans criticized the violence but generally sympathized
with the shoemakers.66 An essay penned by "A Journeyman
Cordwainer" compared the action against Beatty to the tarring
and feathering of Tories during the Revolution. 6 7 On occasion,
he argued, "the people could not permit justice to be stymied in
the courts; they had to take matters into their own hands."6' The
anonymous author concluded, "I am serious . . . I think the
discretionary law of tarring, [et cetera] is a happy general
supplement to particular law, providing for heinous offences
59. R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS,
AND THE CHARACTER WARS OF THE NEW NATION 149 (2012).
60. See STEFFEN, supra note 31, at 232.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id at 236.
64. Id. at 209.
65. STEFFEN, supra note 31, at 209, 220.





which would otherwise escape punishment." 6 9  Although the
assailants were found guilty of assault in January 1809, the
governor pardoned them after three days in jail.70 Beatty was
later tried for perjury and acquitted.n
In June 1809, the Union went on strike and refused to work
for two shoemakers, James Sloan and Angello Atkinson, who
employed journeymen who did not belong to the Union.7 2 Sloan
was a well-known Federalist, clearly at odds with Republicans
who continued to support the strikers.7 3 One of the non-Union
journeymen, John Davidson, claimed the Union was involved in
a criminal conspiracy to prevent nonmembers from obtaining
employment.74 The Baltimore County Criminal Court issued
thirty-seven indictments against Union members. The Union
hired Luther Martin to represent them, and though only one
journeyman was tried, the conviction of Union President George
Powly apparently led to the Union's demise. 76
B. The Baltimore Riots of 1812
In 1808, Alexander Contee Hanson Jr. founded the Federal
Republican, "an extreme Federalist journal on almost every
count."7 7 Hanson was a member of Baltimore and Maryland's
aristocratic elite, and the Federal Republican delighted in
skewering Jeffersonian Republicans and their supporters, which
it often designated as "THE RABBLE," and routinely attacked
radical democracy.78  The Federal Republican was also
committed to promoting British interests. 79  Hoffman and
69. Id. For more information on the various labor conspiracy cases in the early
federal period, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 128-79 (1993).
70. STEFFEN, supra note 31, at 220-21.
71. Id. at 221.
72. Id. at 222.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. STEFFEN, supra note 31, at 222.
76. Id. at 223.
77. JEFFREY L. PASLEY, "THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS": NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 241 (2001).
78. See id
79. Id. ("[I]ts distate for democracy and enthusiasm for the British cause in the
Napoleonic Wars rivaled anything found in Hartford or Boston.").
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Hanson were strong political allies and likely friends.so They
apparently attended St. John's College in Annapolis at the same
time, both were Federalists, both were lawyers, and both were
from aristocratic families.8 ' The duo also believed in
governance by the elite, not the masses.82
On June 1, 1812, President James Madison asked Congress
to consider declaring war against Great Britain, and the Senate
agreed on June 17.83 Baltimore Republicans strongly supported
war, but Hanson raged against it, stating "[w]e are avowedly
hostile to the administration of James Madison, and we never
will breathe under the dominion, direct or derivative, of
Bonaparte, let it be acknowledged when it may."84 On June 22,
a mob destroyed the Federal Republican's printing office, and
Hanson escaped to the District of Columbia, where he resumed
printing. 8 5  At this point, the riot was channeled within its
traditional limits, and the mob focused on the destruction of
property rather than people. 86
Instead of disbanding, the mob gathered most nights for
almost a month in search of various targets to strike.8 7 On July
26, Hanson and other Federalists returned to Baltimore and the
next day distributed an edition of the Federal Republican." The
paper appeared to be printed on Charles Street in Baltimore, but
it was actually published in Georgetown. 89  Hanson and his
supporters then barricaded themselves in the Charles Street
building and waited to see if the mob would respond-it did.90
By daybreak on July 28, Thaddeus Gale and John Williams
had been shot to death by defenders of the Federal
80. See ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 1634-1980,
at 178 (1988).
81. See PASLEY, supra note 77, at 241 (discussing Hanson); Bloomfield, supra note
3, at 674 (discussing Hoffman).
82. See PASLEY, supra note 77, at 241 (discussing Hanson); Bloomfield, supra note
3, at 676 (discussing Hoffman).
83. DAVID B. MATTERN, JAMES MADISON: PATRIOT, POLITICIAN, AND PRESIDENT
73 (2005).
84. PASLEY, supra note 77, at 246.
85. Cassell, supra note 38, at 244-45.
86. See Gilje, Baltimore Riots, supra note 38, at 549 ("[O]pportunity for doing
further violence was declined when the mob had [Federalist newspaperman Jacob]
Wagner's house and family at its mercy...
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id. at 552.
89. Id.
90. Cassell, supra note 38, at 247.
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Republican,91 and Hanson and his supporters had agreed to
surrender.92 Some of Hanson's supporters successfully fled the
Charles Street building, but others were captured by the mob
and beaten.93 Some members of the mob demanded death for
"every monarchist and aristocrat it could lay its hands on."94
Twenty-seven-year-old David Hoffinan was one of those
escapees whom the mob caught and nearly hanged.95 Hanson
and his companions were taken to jail. 96  That night, the mob
entered the jail and beat to death James Lingan, a general in the
Revolutionary War, as he pleaded on his knees for mercy.97
Members of the mob also severely beat Light Horse Harry
Lee-another famous Revolutionary War general and father of
Robert E. Lee-Hanson, and other Federalists. 98
After the riots were finally quelled in early August, the
recriminations began. Federalists used Lingan's death to win a
majority in the Maryland House of Delegates; thus, the lessons
of the riots for Federalists were that all extralegal violence must
be rejected, and that only force was sufficient to halt mob
violence. 99 The first lesson was about the primacy of law over
custom. When the mob began demolishing the Federal
Republican's printing house in June, Republican Mayor Edward
Johnson urged the mob to stop.' 00 In reply, one man said, "Mr.
Johnson, I know you very well, no body wants to hurt you; but
the laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of nature and
reason prevail."' 0' This statement reflected a view abhorrent to
Federalists. The mob, rejecting both the elite and a common
91. For a detailed account of the fighting, see id. at 247-59.
92. Id. at 252.
93. Id.
94. BRUGGER, supra note 80, at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. JOHN NEAL, WANDERING RECOLLECTIONS OF A SOMEWHAT BusY LIFE 206
(Boston, Roberts Bros. 1869) ("Professor Hoffman would have been strung up, without
judge or jury, on a tree-branch, yet overhanging Jones's Falls, but for the providential
interference of a stranger, who satisfied the murderers that they had got hold of the wrong
man.").
96. See BRUGGER, supra note 80, at 178 ("[A]uthorities had persuaded the Federalist
band to surrender and marched the men to jail .....
97. Cassell, supra note 38, at 256.
98. Gilje, Baltimore Riots, supra note 38, at 555. The riot was noted by Alexis de
Tocqueville as an "example of the excesses to which despotism of the majority may lead."
1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8, at 233 n.4.
99. See Cassell, supra note 38, at 259.
100. Gilje, Baltimore Riots, supra note 38, at 549.
101. Id.
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idea of law, asserted an authority to govern and to govern
beyond the common law.102 A report, A Portrait of the Evils of
Democracy, Submitted to the Consideration of the People of
Maryland, drafted by the Committee of Grievances and Courts
of Justice of the Maryland House of Delegates, was issued
condemning the riot and captured the view of the aristocratic
Federalist elite.10 3
C. Hoffman and Professional Deportment: 1810-1837
When A Course of Legal Study was published in 1817,
Hoffinan had been married for over a year, and his wife, Mary
McKean, from a prominent Philadelphia family, had given birth
to their first child, a son.104  In a letter from the mid-1820s,
Hoffman claimed that he earned $9,000 annually from 1818
through 1823, which, if true, made him one of Baltimore's
wealthiest lawyers.10 Though he had not yet lectured there,
Hoffman was appointed Professor of Law at the new Law
Institute at University of Maryland in 1814.106 A Course of
Legal Study was immediately and lavishly praised for its
learnedness, most importantly in an unsigned review by
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.10 7 After a "perusal of Mr.
Hoffman's work .. . we have not the slightest hesitation to
declare, that it contains by far the most perfect system for the
study of the law, which has ever been offered to the public[].""
Hoffman's only reference to professional deportment in the
first edition of A Course of Legal Study came in the book's
"Auxiliary Subjects."' 09 This section began with a short
introduction from Hoffman, who used optimistic terms to
102. DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 229
(2005) (noting Federalists hoped the Constitution would "create neither a government of
men nor one of law but rather one of men governed by a common understanding of law").
103. See generally A PORTRAIT OF THE EVILS OF DEMOCRACY, SUBMITTED TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND (Baltimore, 1816).
104. David Hoffman Time Line, in HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES, supra
note 4, at 53, 53.
105. Bloomfield, supra note 3, at 678.
106. Id.
107. See A Course of Legal Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students of Law in
the United States, 6 N. AM. REV. & MISC. J. 45, 76 (1818) (book review).
108. Id
109. See HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1817, supra note 2, at 324.
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describe the legal profession." 0 A lawyer undertook proper
conduct when he acquired "liberal ideas," as such knowledge
was equated with "honourable views." 11
Four years later, Hoffman published his Syllabus of a
Course ofLectures on Law.112 The final lecture was intended to
be devoted to the topic of professional deportment.1 3 Although
reprints indicate that several lectures included some detail, this
lecture included just its title. In late 1822, Hoffman began
lecturing at the University of Maryland.'1 4  His introductory
lecture was published a year later," and two additional lectures
and an address to law students were published between 1824 and
1826.116 From 1822 to 1832, he represented clients in six
separate cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, and
also appeared before the Maryland Court of Appeals on several
occasions. This decade represented Hoffman's peak as a
lawyer and legal educator.
Beginning in 1833, Hoffman suffered a number of personal
and professional setbacks. His only son died that year.11s
Although he remained listed as an attorney in the Baltimore
Directory,"9 his last recorded appearance before any appellate
110. See id at 324-28.
11l. Id.at327.
112. See David Hoffman, Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Law, reprinted in
HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES, supra note 4, at 61, 61-156.
113. Id. at 156.
114. Shaffer, supra note 4, at 128.
115. David Hoffman, A Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Lectures, now
Delivering in the University of Maryland, reprinted in HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND
LECTURES, supra note 4, at 157, 157-232.
116. David Hoffman, A Lecture being the Second of a Series of Lectures,
Introductory to a Course of Lectures Now Delivering in the University of Maryland,
reprinted in HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES, supra note 4, at 249, 249-98;
David Hoffman, A Lecture being the Third of a Series of Lectures, Introductory to a
Course of Lectures Now Delivering in the University of Maryland, reprinted in HOFFMAN:
LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES, supra note 4, at 299, 299-360; David Hoffman, An Address
to Students of Law in the United States, reprinted in HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND
LECTURES, supra note 4, at 233, 233-248.
117. See David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at 53-54.
118. See id at 54.
119. See MATCHETT'S BALTIMORE DIRECTOR 92 (Baltimore, R.J. Matchett 1833);
MATCHETT'S BALTIMORE DIRECTOR 123 (Baltimore, R.J. Matchett 1835); MATCHETT'S
BALTIMORE DIRECTOR 169 (Baltimore, R.J. Matchett 1837); MATCHETT'S BALTIMORE
DIRECTOR 207 (Baltimore, R.J. Matchett 1842).
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court was in 1832.120 He gave his final lecture at the University
of Maryland in 1833 and then became engaged in a long and
serious legal and financial dispute with the University.121
At the same time that Hoffman was dealing with personal
struggles, the legal profession as a whole was suffering because
the status of, and honor bestowed upon, lawyers was regularly
questioned. One remarkable example of the venom directed at
lawyers during this time was A Letter to the Honorable Rufus
Choate, written in June 1831 and published as a pamphlet in
1832.122 Choate, a brilliant Massachusetts lawyer and Whig,123
was attacked by Democrat and labor leader Frederick Robinson
for using the cabal of the "brotherhood of the bar" to prevent
Robinson from representing another in court.124 Robinson made
a long and artful argument in favor of opening the profession to
all, for limiting its membership was "anti-republican,"
emblematic of associations whose object is "to settle society
down into cast[e]s, and render the barriers between them
impassable; to form society into aristocratic, subordinate
gradations, and 'orders,' and to fix insuperable boundaries
between them. But the basis of our community is equality, and
not subordination." 25 The bar was a part of a powerful
aristocracy that "saps the liberties of the people," and whose
members "exalt themselves and. . . degrade and debase the rest
of our species," to "distinguish themselves, from what they call
'the common herd, the mob, the vulgar, the rabble."'l
2 6
120. See David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at 53-55 (noting Hoffman
"[a]ppear[ed] before the U.S. Supreme Court in Robert Oliver v. James Alexander and
Seventy-seven others, Seamen of the Warren" in 1832).
121. See David Hoffman: A Biographical Sketch, supra note 4, at 20.
122. See Letter from Frederick Robinson to the Honorable Rufus Choate (June 25,
1831), reprinted in FREDERICK ROBINSON, A LETTER TO THE HON. RUFUS CHOATE,
CONTAINING A BRIEF EXPOSURE OF LAW CRAFT, AND SOME OF THE ENCROACHMENTS OF
THE BAR UPON THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE (n.p., 1832) [hereinafter Letter
from Frederick Robinson].
123. See Claude M. Fuess, Choate, Rufus, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 4, at 86, 86-90; Jean V. Matthews, Choate, Rufus, in YALE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 4, at 105, 105-06; Joseph
Hodges Choate, Rufus Choate, in 3 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 5, at 531,
531; DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 225
(1979).
124. Letter from Frederick Robinson, supra note 122, at 3.
125. Id at 15; see also DANIEL FELLER, THE JACKSONIAN PROMISE: AMERICA,
1815-1840, at 130-31 (1995) (discussing the disconnect between laborers and the
aristocracy).
126. Letter from Frederick Robinson, supra note 122, at 16.
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Robinson took a similar tone in an 1834 oration to trade-union
members, in which he attacked the monopoly of the bar, and
claimed "[t]he judiciary in this state, and in every State where
judges hold their office during life, is the headquarters of the
aristocracy." 27 Robinson's excoriation of Choate and the legal
profession was a paradigmatic example of Jacksonian
democracy-of the rejection of rule of an aristocratic elite in
favor of a body based on "equality, and not subordination." It
served also as an example of everything David Hoffman
opposed.
Law addresses across the nation also changed.
Pennsylvania lawyer Job Tyson spoke to the Law Academy of
the Philadelphia Bar in 1839, opening: "It is natural to feel a
deep solicitude for the repute of a profession, which we have
chosen as the business of our lives."l 28 He began this way
because it was true that "[m]any bad men, wearing the panoply
of the profession, have been enabled to perpetrate their deeds
under its sanction."1 2 9  It was crucial that lawyers, "at the
darkest period of our political history, when tyranny wore the
guise of a necessary tax for the public good," cultivate an
"elevated honour." 30  In 1831, Massachusetts lawyer Emory
Washburn spoke to the Worcester Lyceum.' 3 ' He rejected the
Jacksonian claim that "ri hts and privileges are unequally
distributed and enjoyed." 32 Massachusetts lawyer Peter
Oxenbridge Thacher defended the legal system on the ground
that it "constitutes the ligament of society," binding all classes,
from merchant and mechanic to lawyer and farmer, and worked
127. Frederick Robinson, A Program for Labor, reprinted in SOCIAL THEORIES OF
JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPRESENTATIVE WRITINGS OF THE PERIOD 1825-1850, at
320, 328 (Joseph L. Blau ed. 1947) (containing portions of Robinson's oration); see also
TOMLINS, supra note 69, at 191-92 (noting speech and response by Boston lawyer Peter
Oxenbridge Thacher).
128. JOB R. TYSON, DISCOURSE ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL CHARACTER 5
(Philadelphia, Order of the Law Academy 1839).
129. Id. at 6; see also JOHN M. SCOTT, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED TO THE LAW
ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION, IN SEPTEMBER 1830, at 7
(Philadelphia, Mifflin & Parry 1830) ("Our profession has suffered deeply from the
unworthiness of individuals who have worn its garb without adopting its principles.").
130. TYSON, supra note 128, at 9, 29.
131. See EMORY WASHBURN, A LECTURE, READ BEFORE THE WORCESTER
LYCEUM, MARCH 30TH, 1831, at 3 (Worcester, Dorr & Howland 1831).
132. Id. For more on Washburn, see Robert M. Spector, Emory Washburn:
Conservator of the New England Legal Heritage, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1978).
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as "that great leveller of human arrogance, and equalizer of
social right and duty."' 33 Leveling did not interest Hoffman.
Democratization of the legal profession worked together
with political democratization. In 1831, the Maryland legislature
reduced the required time of legal study to two years. 13 4 The
aristocratic argument against relaxing bar-admission standards
was made by Washburn, who concluded states had a choice
between "an enlightened, educated, independent body of men, or
a host of self-constituted, noisy and narrow-minded
pettifoggers." 3 5  Hoffman sought to preserve the lawyer's
elevated status in society, but this proved difficult. Writing in
1846, Hoffman declared his "deep conviction that the high tone
of the Bar has suffered some impairment."l 36 This had been his
conviction since at least 1837, when Hoffman's Miscellaneous
Thoughts on Men, Manners, and Things ("Miscellaneous
Thoughts") was published:
The [fear of lawyers], so prevalent among the lower orders
in this and other countries, seems to me to be often more in
words than in substance; for though lawyers are the
constant subjects of the popular jeers, of the railing of the
multitude, and of the ridicule even of the drama; and
though the people have habitually leagued them with the
devil, and love to tell many disparaging tales of them, yet
lawyers still remain the most entrusted, the most honoured,
and withal, the most efficient and useful body of men, in
proportion to their number, of any in the community; and,
if there be still remaining among us any elements that can
133. PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, AN ADDRESS, PRONOUNCED ON THE FIRST
TUESDAY OF MARCH, 1831, at 17 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little, & Wilkins 1831). In late
1834, Thacher, then a judge, responded to Robinson's Fourth of July speech by instructing
the grand jury that "[e]mployers may not combine against their workmen to depress, by
unfair means, their wages; nor may workmen combine against employers, unjustly, to raise
them." TOMLINS, supra note 69, at 193. Thacher concluded, "This is even handed justice,
and is as good for the laborer as for the employer." Id. (quoting Thacher).
134. Ch. 268, § 2, LAWS OFMARYLAND--1831, at 1032; see also 2 ANTON-
HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 259 (1965)
(quoting two-year provision); Nolan, supra note 32, at 993 (same); 1 SAMS & RILEY,
supra note 5, at 245-46 (same).
135. Emory Washburn, On the Legal Profession in New England, 19 AM. JURIST &
L. MAG. 49, 52 (1838).
136. DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS,




be called aristocratic, they will be found no where so
certainly, as among gentlemen of the legal profession.'37
D. The Baltimore Bank Riot of 1835
Two other outside events may have influenced the more
pessimistic tone of the second edition of Hoffman's A Course of
Legal Study. First, the re-election of Andrew Jackson in 1832
was anathema to Hoffman.' 3 8 Jackson revived the party system
and emphasized ideological differences among the people,139
which Hoffman and other Whigs believed sharply divided
society.' 40 By the 1836 presidential election, the idea of "[p]arty
itself became a partisan issue."1 41 Second, Baltimore, known as
"mobtown" since the 1812 Riot, 142 exploded in violence in
August 1835. The Baltimore Bank Riot was just one of many
riots in the United States that year. 143 Niles' Weekly Register, a
national newspaper printed in Baltimore, listed fifty-three riots
in the United States in 1835 alone.144 Baltimore's riot, caused in
large part due to the collapse of the Bank of Maryland, reflected
continuing deep class and social differences in Baltimore.
After Andrew Jackson vetoed the re-charter of the Second
Bank of the United States in 1832,145 he began to destroy the
"Monster" by depositing all federal funds in selected state
137. ANTHONY GRUMBLER, MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS ON MEN, MANNERS, AND
THINGS 323-24 (Baltimore, Coale & Co. 1837). Hoffman often used the pseudonym
"Anthony Grumbler" in written works. See David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at
54.
138. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 356.
139. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention in
Nineteenth Century New York, 1 N. Y. U. J. L. & LIBERTY 727, 735 (2005) ("In the late
1820s, the first American party system had collapsed, leaving various factions of
Jeffersonian Republicans who would be divided again into two parties with the polarizing
ascendancy of Andrew Jackson.").
140. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 356.
141. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 485 (2007). Another annoyance may have
been the decision of the Democratic Party to meet in Baltimore in 1835 for its national
convention. See id. Hoffman's concern may have been ameliorated by the election of
James Thomas, an anti-Jacksonian, as Governor of Maryland. See BRUGGER, supra note
80, at 806; GRUMBLER, supra note 137, at 194 (attacking the "miserable logic, and worse
morals, of very many partisans").
142. Gilje, Baltimore Riots, supra note 38, at 556.
143. ASHRAF H. A. RUSHDY, AMERICAN LYNCHING 32 (2012).
144. RICHARDS, supra note 41, at 12; see also RUSHDY, supra note 143, at 32 ("The
year 1835 saw at least 147 riots, 109 of which occurred in the summer.").
145. ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 80-81 (1967).
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banks, which his adversaries called "pet" banks, and
withdrawing funds from the Second Bank as needed to pay
federal expenses.1 46 Both actions were intended to bleed the
Second Bank dry, and Jackson succeeded.'47 The pet banks
were usually "friendly" to Democratic views, and one such bank
was the Baltimore-based Union Bank, operated by Thomas
Ellicott.148
In 1831, Evan Poultney purchased a controlling interest in
the Bank of Maryland.149 He appointed two young Baltimore
lawyers, John Glenn and Reverdy Johnson, to the bank's board
of directors. 50 To attract capital to the Bank of Maryland, the
directors offered to pay a munificent five percent on all deposits,
which encouraged ordinary Baltimoreans to deposit their
savings with the bank.'51 These men and three others then
conspired to enrich themselves through the Bank of
Maryland.152 In spring 1833, the group correctly predicted that
Treasury Secretary Roger B. Taney, a Maryland lawyer, would
name Union Bank as one of the government's "pet" banks.153
They then resolved to use funds from the Bank of Maryland to
purchase as much stock in the Union Bank as possible.154 A
year later, the Bank of Maryland closed, but not before Johnson
engaged in several fraudulent acts designed to hide his
involvement in its dissolution. 5 The closing of the Bank of
Maryland was followed by the spread of pamphlets by the
principals accusing each other of duplicity and fraud. 15  By
early August 1835, the people of Baltimore, many of whom had
lost their savings and were now at the mercy of an equity
chancellor in charge of the matter, were anxious and angry.
They looked to take out their anger on someone. 57
Samuel Harker operated the Baltimore Republican
newspaper, the only one of five Baltimore papers to support
146. Id. at 125.
147. See id
148. Id. at 125-26.
149. SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 32.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 33.
153. See id. at 34.
154. SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 34.
155. See id at 35-37.
156. Id. at 39-43.
157. See id at 44.
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Andrew Jackson's Democratic Republicans. 5 8  Harker was a
determined Jacksonian, and "pitted the bank and the
'aristocracy' against Andrew Jackson and 'the people."'59
Jacksonians uniformly opposed aristocracy in favor of "the
people."1 60 Nevertheless, banks, through their control of money,
were a likely source of aristocratic rule.161
Like the anonymous "Journeyman Cordwainer" and others
before him, Harker also approved of the people's authority to
take the law into their own hands when the law failed to meet
the people's needs.' 62 Thus, if the law was impotent, it would
"sometimes be proper for the populace to punish certain
offences which can be reached by no other means."1 63  The
ultimate power of the people was found in "Judge Lynch," or
"lynching"-the authority of the people to take the law into their
own hands when necessary.' 64  "Lynching" was first widely
used in the aftermath of the Vicksburg, Mississippi hangings of
five gamblers on July 6, 1835.165 At the time of the Bank of
Maryland's failure, anti-Jacksonians viewed many of Andrew
Jackson's actions as lawless,1 6 6 leading some to view "Jackson
as a kind of Judge Lynch, the inventor, in his way, of
lynching."l 67
158. Seeid at2l.
159. SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 23; see also id at 24 ("[A]n organized aristocracy
is leagued in concert against the rights of the poor, and the liberties of the country."). On
the origins of the sovereignty of "the people," see the brilliant book by EDMUND S.
MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA (1988).
160. See SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 23.
161. See id at 29 (quoting Harker's statement that aristocrats planned "to rule the
country by means of their money" and, should they succeed, "to destroy the freedom of
thought, the liberty of speech, and the rights of action, which the constitution of our
country has guaranteed to the poor man as well as the man of wealth").
162. See id.
163. Id. at 31.
164. Id. ("[T]he figure of Judge Lynch came to symbolize the latent power of the
people-a power that must not be denied."); see also CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, THE MANY
FACES OF JUDGE LYNCH: EXTRALEGAL VIOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 27-38
(2002) (describing the rise of "lynchings" in the 1830s); RUSHDY, supra note 143, at 28-38
(same).
165. WALDREP, supra note 164, at 37; RUSHDY, supra note 143, at 32; see also The
Vicksburg Tragedy, 48 NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER (Baltimore) 381-82 (1835) (reprinting
an article on the Vicksburg lynchings).
166. HOWE, supra note 141, at 411 ("[Jackson] did not manifest a general respect for
the authority of the law when it got in the way of the policies he chose to pursue.").
167. WALDREP, supra note 164, at 36.
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On Wednesday, August 5, 1835, several hundred persons
milled about with the apparent common view that John Glenn
and Reverdy Johnson "had mismanaged the trust and abused the
confidence reposed in them." 6 8 Though several boys threw
stones at Johnson's house, others stopped them in the hope that
the equity chancellor would assist those who had lost their
savings when the Bank of Maryland closed.169 The next night,
Johnson's house incurred more damage, and Mayor Jesse Hunt
attempted to halt destruction of property by urging the crowd to
follow the rule of law.170 On Saturday night, rioting began and,
despite the attack on Johnson's house being a failure, rioters
successfully destroyed John Glenn's home and carried off his
wine collection. 171 On Sunday, the rioters finally entered
Johnson's home, and finding that some furniture had been
removed, obliterated his library, including his "rare works of the
law," and burned the house. 7 2 The chaos finally petered out on
Tuesday, August 11, 1835.173
During the course of the Baltimore Bank Riot, at least five
died and twenty others were seriously injured.174 The criminal
trials of those charged with participating in the riot were fairly
tried; some were convicted, others acquitted. 7 5  Reverdy
Johnson continued his efforts to conceal his involvement in the
fraud by filing civil suits against Evan Poultney and others and
engaging a protdg6, assistant attorney general Richard Gill, to
obtain indictments against several persons on whom Johnson
wished to 17lace blame for the collapse of the Bank of
Maryland.' 7 Johnson was occasionally successful in these legal
168. SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 46; see also Narrative ofEvent-In Baltimore, 48
NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER (Baltimore) 412-16 (1835) (providing primary report on the
rioting).
169. SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 46.
170. Id. at 47-48.
171. See id. at 53-57.
172. Id. at 60-61.
173. Id. at 69.
174. SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 1.
175. See id. at 79-85.
176. See id. at 88-89. Johnson's biographer exonerates him from any responsibility,
a conclusion directly at odds with Shalhope. See BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF REVERDY
JOHNSON 12 (1914) ("Johnson was conclusively cleared from any wrong-doing in
connection with the bank.").
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proceedings, but the trials were unconvincing as a public
matter.177
E. Hoffman's Second Edition of A Course of Legal Study
and the Unrepentant Aristocrat
One of the criticisms of Hoffman's 1817 A Course of Legal
Study was its length.17 8  The second edition was more than
double the size of the first, comprising 876 pages in two
volumes. 179 One of the additions made by Hoffman was to his
discussion of professional deportment.18 0  Instead of listing
eleven disparate readings to acquaint the reader with
professional deportment, Hoffman provided a syllabus of
twenty-one, including four from the Bible, followed by an essay
and fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment.18 1
By the time the second edition went to press, all of the
criminal trials concerning the Baltimore Bank Riot were
complete, as well as many of the trials in which Johnson worked
assiduously to demonstrate he was a wronged man.182 Hoffman
left no record of his thoughts of either the riot or the collapse of
the Bank of Maryland. As a general matter, the riot likely
confirmed his view of the dangers of Jacksonian democracy, and
Johnson's actions would have struck Hoffman as dishonorable
and venal.
The purpose of Hoffman's exposition on professional
deportment is found in his introductory essay. Even though the
science of the law "furnishes the heart with the purest principles
of action .. . the practice of our profession is peculiarly
calculated to suppress their influence." 1 The depravity of man
often tempted lawyers to seek fame, money, or power. This
177. Compare Bernard Christian Steiner, Reverdy Johnson, in 4 GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS, supra note 5, at 407, 409 ("[Johnson] clearly won the right to be counted among
the greatest of the many great men who have shed luster upon the Maryland bar."), with
SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 88 ("[T]he trials . . . cast additional opprobrium upon
[Johnson] .. . .").
178. Review: A Course ofLegal Study, 3 THE PORTICO 192, 199 (1817).
179. See generally HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4.
180. The second edition covered professional deportment over fifty-five pages,
whereas Hoffman only devoted five pages to the topic in the first edition. Compare
HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1817, supra note 2, at 324-29, with 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY:
1836, supra note 4 at 720-75.
181. See 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 720-75.
182. See SHALHOPE, supra note 41, at 85, 98-100.
183. 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 745.
2014] 593
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:571
temptation was joined by the fact that "disputes and
controversies" in which lawyers were necessarily involved "are
frequently founded on bad, if not the worst of passions."' 84
Thus, young lawyers needed to be on guard to avoid
professional calamity through seduction by passion. The lawyer
avoided this fate through "careful study of the moral sciences"
and, just as importantly, by understanding that law could instill
"the principles of an elevated honour."' 8 5 Honor demonstrated
one's virtue, which was the antidote to the temptation of the
passions. Further, a young lawyer's departure from "the most
honourable and refined moral deportment. . . excites more than
ordinary distrust," for the lawyer's trustworthiness is essential to
his success. 186  Hoffman used the words "honour,"
"honourable," or "honourably" thirteen times in his seven-and-
one-half page essay on professional deportment in the second
edition of A Course ofLegal Study.187
Although honor consisted both of "genteel" and "primal"
pathways,'8 8 it was comprised of three aspects: (1) a belief in
one's worthiness; (2) publishing one's claim of self-worth to the
public; and (3) "assessment of the claim by the public, a
judgment based upon the behavior of the claimant." 89
Hoffman's emphasis on honor reflected his understanding of the
world, a world disappearing in Baltimore and most of
Jacksonian America.190 A gentleman acted not to receive the
praise of others, or as a matter of pride, but in order to
demonstrate his understanding of his elevated role in society.
He also acted honorably to demonstrate his virtuous reputation.
Writing at this time, Tocqueville noted, "[h]onor, in times of the
zenith of its power directs men's wills more than their
beliefs."' 9' Gordon S. Wood, discussing the late-eighteenth
century American gentleman, wrote, "[h]onor was exclusive,
184. Id.
185. Id. at 747.
186. Id
187. See id. at 744-51.
188. BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS & BEHAVIOR IN THE
OLD SOUTH, at xvi-xvii (25th anniversary ed. 2007).
189. Id. at 14.
190. See GEORGE WILSON PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE AND BEAUMONT IN AMERICA
494-96 (1938) (discussing a late 1831 conversation between Tocqueville and Baltimore
lawyer John Latrobe, that noted the aristocratic "spirit" of Baltimore and its displacement
by democratic views).
191. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8, at 592.
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heroic, and aristocratic, and it presumed a hierarchical world
different from the one that was emerging in America."l 92
In 1837, Hoffman tried his hand at literature, publishing
Miscellaneous Thoughts, using the not-well-hidden pseudonym
Anthony Grumbler.193  Hoffman rejected the Jacksonian
"Numerical Principle of Government", or equality, as
"jacobinical," a "suicidal" act.194 He contrasted the "two great
and distinct classes of people; the one selfish, crude,. and mainly
unprincipled, the other patriotic, enlightened, and mainly
virtuous."l 9 5 The former group was "the earthy, or democratic
party."l96 The latter was "the intellectual or aristocratic
party."' 97 For Hoffman, "aristocrat" was a term of honor, and
"aristocracy" was favorably contrasted with the "ultraism of our
democracy."1 98  Hoffman was raised in a place in which
different classes of people naturally undertook different roles in
society. While some opposed these hierarchies, they were
common to Baltimore and Maryland in the eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries. Indeed, class conflict was one of the
reasons for the 1812 Riot. Class-based grievances and
resentment also helped trigger the riots throughout the young
nation during the summer of 1835.
Hoffman's emphasis on honor allowed him to keenly
perceive conflicts of interest between lawyer and his client. For
example, Hoffman explained clearly why a lawyer should not be
192. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789-1815, at 159 (2009); see also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Honor, in A COMPANION TO
AMERICAN THOUGHT 310-11 (Richard Wightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg eds.,
1995) (discussing importance of the concept of honor in American history).
193. David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at 54.
194. GRUMBLER, supra note 137, at 233-34.
195. Id. at 233.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 233-34. But see William Leggett, The Division of Parties, reprinted in
SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPRESENTATIVE WRITINGS OF THE
PERIOD 1825-1850, supra note 126, at 66, 67 ("The one party is for a popular government;
the other for an aristocracy. The one party is composed, in a great measure, of the farmers,
mechanics, laborers, and other producers of the middling and lower classes, according to
the common gradation by the scale of wealth, and the other of the consumers, the rich, the
proud, the privileged, of those who, if our Government were converted into an aristocracy,
would become our dukes, lords, marquises, and baronets.").
198. GRUMBLER, supra note 137, at 36. Tocqueville concluded that "hidden at the
bottom of a lawyer's soul one finds some of the tastes and habits of an aristocracy." 1
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8, at 243.
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permitted to purchase an interest in a client's cause.199 Hoffman
initially distinguished between contingent fee arrangements, to
which he did not object, and the purchasing of causes, which
interfered with the "absolute purity" of the lawyer-client
relationship. 200 A contingent fee contract was an "independent
contract" in which the lawyer exerted no "influence" on the
client, and when the client was poor, to ban such arrangements
was to make the client unable to prosecute his claim or to defend
against the claim of another.20 1 On the other hand, the purchase
of the client's cause ordinarily occurred after the lawyer and
client had established a relationship, and "after the strength of
[the client's] case has become known to [the lawyer]."202
With regard to other aspects of the fee, a lawyer was to
charge only a fee for "what [his] judgment and conscience
inform [him] is [his] due, and nothing more." 203 Additionally,
an honorable lawyer refused to succumb to the baser aspects of
the marketplace. A lawyer should avoid "halffees," the practice
of taking a discounted amount based on the dishonorable action
of "underbidding ... professional brethren." 204 Hoffman also
cautioned lawyers against commingling their money with client
funds, stressed the duty to return client funds promptly, urged
lawyers to refuse to act as a witness when also serving as
counsel or to switch sides, and reminded lawyers that they must
preserve and return all papers to the client. 205  Additionally,
Hoffman believed the lawyer should act respectfully and
courteously at all times toward the judge, officers of the court
and opposing counsel, no matter the other's "character and
deportment." 06
The idea of honor played a prominent role in several other
resolutions. When a client's reputation was at stake, no
compromise was possible, and the matter necessarily had to go
to a verdict. Hoffman made clear that this should occur even
when the opposing party possessed an "elevated standing," for
199. See 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 760-62 (Resolution
XXIV).
200. See id. at 760-61.
201. Id. at 761.
202. Id. at 762.
203. Id. at 762 (Resolution XXVII).
204. 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 763 (Resolution XXVIII).
205. See id at 753, 762-65, 766 (Resolutions VIII, XXV, XXVI, XXX, and XXXV).
206. See id. at 752-53 (Resolutions III, IV, V and VI).
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the "great and wealthy" were required to make amends publicly
and openly to the "ignoble and poor."207 Public exoneration of
one's reputation was necessary because public honor comprised
much of a person's reputation. Hoffman's understanding of
honor also affected his definition of the lawyer's duty to his
clients. He believed a lawyer should be "zealous and
industrious" in his representation, but the meaning of "zealous
and industrious" representation was framed in terms of the
lawyer's honor.208 Hoffman sensibly urged lawyers to refuse to
make "frivolous and vexatious defences" but also suggested
lawyers refrain from making any claim or defense that "ought
not, to be sustained," for aiding a client then "would be lending
[the lawyer] to a dishonourable use of legal means." 209
Honor also led Hoffman to include resolutions advising
lawyers to refrain from pleading the statute of limitations or the
defense of infancy as the sole defense against an honest demand,
even though he was aware that the law permitted those defenses.
The lawyer "shall claim to be the sole judge. . . of the occasions
proper for their use."210 Further, Hoffman urged that a lawyer
not "use [his] endeavours to arrest, or to impede the course of
justice, by special resorts to ingenuity" those charged with
crimes, the evidence of which left "no just doubt of their
guilt." 211 It was inappropriate to defend one of such "atrocious
character, who [had] violated the laws of God and man,"
because the accused's actions had left him "entitled to no such
special exertions from any member of our pure and honourable
profession."212 The most one could undertake for such a man
207. Id. at 759 (Resolution XXII).
208. See id. at 798 (Resolution XVIII).
209. See 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 754 (Resolutions X and
XI).
210. See id. at 754-55 (Resolutions XII and XIII); see also The Good Advocate, 1
J.L. 58, 58 (1830) ("The good advocate is one who will not plead the cause wherein his
tongue must be confuted by his conscience."). This quote is taken from a 1642 English
work by Thomas Fuller, though the Journal ofLaw does not reference it. See ALLYSON N.
MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750-1850, at 206 (2003). For a sensitive and
clear-eyed assessment of the views of lawyers from Hoffman's time to the present on this
question, see Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., "Technical" Defenses: Ethics,
Morals, and the Lawyer as Friend, 14 CLINICAL L. REv. 337 (2007).
211. 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 755 (Resolution XV).
212. Id. at 756.
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was "a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their
cause." 213
The understanding of the lawyer's duty of zealous
representation underwent a transition in the 1830s. Philadelphia
lawyer David Paul Brown wrote in his 1856 memoir, "[a]
lawyer is not morally responsible for the act or motive of a
party, in maintaining an unjust cause, but he is morally
responsible, if he does it knowingly, however he may 'plate sin
with gold."' 214  Brown was a zealous advocate whose career
spanned the transition from an ethic of honor to an ethic of
conscience. In his Golden Rules for the Examination of
Witnesses, he wrote regarding cross-examination, "in all this,
never be unmindful of your own dignity.... bear all the powers
of your mind-not that you may shine, but that virtue may
triumph, and your cause may prosper." 215  In 1832, Brown
represented Lucretia Chapman, accused of murdering her
husband by poisoning him.216 Brown obtained a not guilty
verdict for Chapman with such zeal that the prosecutor believed
he had "overstepped the bounds of courtroom propriety." 217
Brown and others, including George Sharswood, hid behind the
word "knowingly," and the phrase "maintaining an unjust
cause."2 18 If the lawyer did not know the cause was unjust, he
could continue to act on behalf of the client, allowing the law to
shape the verdict. In defending one accused of a crime, rather
than aiding a plaintiff or defendant in maintaining an unjust
cause, lawyers writing in the 1840s and 1850s believed that
defense counsel should exercise zeal even when the defendant
213. Id. Hoffnan was involved in one well-known criminal case, but his practice
was largely civil. See David Hoffman: A Biographical Sketch, supra note 4, at 25.
214. 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT
THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 30 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856).
215. David Paul Brown, Golden Rules for the Examination of Witnesses, reprinted in
JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY A JURY 309, 311 (John
Townshend ed., New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 2d Am. ed. 1870).
216. For a detailed account of the alleged crime and subsequent criminal trials, see
LINDA WOLFE, THE MURDER OF DR. CHAPMAN: THE LEGENDARY TRIALS OF LUCRETIA
CHAPMAN AND HER LOVER (2004).
217. Id. at 198.
218. BROWN, supra note 214, at 30; see also SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 26.
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had confessed his guilt to the lawyers. 2 19  This specific issue
arose in the infamous Courvoisier case in London in 1840.220
Benjamin Courvoisier, a servant, killed his master. Before
the second day of a three-day trial, he confessed his guilt to his
lawyer, Charles Phillips, but refused to plead guilty.221 After
informing trial judge Baron Parke of Courvoisier's confession,
Phillips was told to continue to defend Courvoisier, using "all
fair arguments arising on the evidence." 222  Courvoisier was
found guilty and sentenced to die. 223  During the very short
period before he was hanged, he publicly confessed his guilt
and, on at least one occasion, informed the public of his prior
confession to Phillips regarding the murder. Although one
early newspaper praised Phillips for defending Courvoisier with
"honourable zeal," 22 5 a letter to the London Times, published
five days after the trial ended, stated, "he who defends the
guilty, knowing him to be so, forgets alike honour and
honesty." 226 A decade later, Phillips's actions were the subject
of extensive commentary in American publications.227 The
propriety of Phillips's actions again was addressed, and
American and British lawyers generally agreed they owed a duty
to defend the guilty client with honorable zeal.
Hoffman knew that a lawyer's refusal to defend on the
grounds of infancy or the statute of limitations was not accepted
lawyer behavior. First, Hoffman himself had been involved in a
case in 1830 in which the opposing party successfully asserted
the statute of limitations.228 Second, attorneys had successfully
219. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 31-33.
220. See generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 19-39
(1973) (detailing the Courvoisier case); see also Ariens, supra note 6, at 375-80
(discussing the Courvoisier case).
221. MELLINKOFF, supra note 220, at 132-33. Courvoisier was apparently able to
use expensive and well-known counsel through the beneficence of Sir George Beaumont,
who employed Courvoisier's uncle as his butler, and through fundraising among London-
based foreign servants. MAY, supra note 210, at 213.
222. MELLINKOFF, supra note 220, at 139-40. Parke sat on the case "to assist [Judge]
Tindal but did not try the case." MAY, supra note 210, at 214.
223. MELLINKOFF, supra note 220, at 123-24.
224. Id. at 126, 131.
225. Id. at 141.
226. Id. at 142.
227. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 379-80 (discussing published articles).
228. See State Use of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Boyd, 2 G. & J. 365,
366 (Md. 1830).
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pled the statute of limitations in Maryland as early as 1808.229
Third, Maryland lawyers successfully made an infancy defense
as early as 1820,230 and a classic infancy case was decided in
1833 by the Maryland Court of Appeals, which heard the case
after a decision by the equity chancellor holding the infancy
defense properly invoked. 23 1  Hoffman was well aware his
Resolutions instructed a lawyer not to make a permissive, but
dishonorable, legal argument on his client's behalf. The lawyer
decided how far to go in representing a client, and defending a
client on the sole ground of the statute of limitations was
dishonorable-an act of knavery. A lawyer was never a mere
agent of a client, and he acted to meet the standards of honor,
not the more practical, or possibly venal, interests of his client.
Consequently, a lawyer's ability to defend on grounds of the
statute of limitations or infancy did not make those actions
honorable, and a lawyer who valued his honor would not make
such pleas.
Thus, the mortar that bound Hoffman's Resolutions was the
concept of honor. Honor required a lawyer to decline to make
legal claims that "ought not, to be sustained." 232 The ethic of
honor joined private and public morality, for a gentleman's
identity was dependent on his public reputation. Hoffman and
other Maryland lawyers of the time were gentlemen, and their
reputation rested on their public actions. A lawyer both
exercised honorable zeal in representing a client and acted to
obtain "substantial justice [for] all parties."233 In addition to
using "honour" and its cognates thirteen times in his
introductory essay, Hoffman used "honourable" or its opposite,
"dishonourable," eleven times in the Resolutions.234
However, Hoffman's views quickly faded. In American
law journals of the 1840s, lawyers discussed the propriety of
lawyers' conduct in terms of conscience.235 In an 1839 speech
229. See Ratrie v. Sanders, 2 H. & J. 327, 327 (Md. 1808); Poe v. Conway Adm'r, 2
H. & J. 307, 307 (Md. 1808).
230. See Davis v. Jacquin, 5 H. & J. 100, 100-01 (Md. 1820).
231. See Clagett v. Salmon, 5 G. & J. 314 (Md. 1833).
232. 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 754 (Resolution XI).
233. See Bloomfield, supra note 3, at 684.
234. See 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 725-75.
235. See, e.g., The Lawyer, His Character, 2 PA. L.J. 185, 187-88 (1843) (reprinting
a book review from Ireland on the behavior of British lawyers and noting the principle of
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to students at Cincinnati College, Timothy Walker defended a
lawyer's representation of "a bad cause" on rule of law grounds,
stating that as long as a lawyer took "no dishonorable advantage,
[he] stand[s] justified at the bar of [his] own conscience,
whatever others may think of [his] conduct." 23 6  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also declared, "[t]he high and
honourable office of a counsel would be degraded to that of a
mercenary, were he compelled to do the biddings of his client
against the dictates of his conscience." 237 In 1846, the Monthly
Law Reporter asked "to be delivered from self-styled
conscientious lawyers, who will engage for no parties that are
not morally right."23 8 George Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of
Lectures discussed how to "assist the [lawyer's] mind in coming
to a safe conclusion in fore conscientiae, in the discharge of
[his] professional duty" while representing a client. 2 39
Once the lawyer agreed to represent a client, he did so with
"warm zeal."240 Sharswood used Courvoisier as a paradigmatic
example of a lawyer acting ethically because he represented to
the best of his abilities a client who had privately confessed his
guilt.24 1 An unsigned review of David Paul Brown's The Forum
in the Southern Literary Messenger echoed this view.242 The
author discussed Brown but mainly tackled the larger issue of
"the ethics of the legal profession." 243 He also made several
points that suggested Hoffman's ethical precepts spoke to a past
ideal. First, although the article positively cites Hoffman's
"excellent treatise on a course of legal study," it does so only to
quote Hoffman's view that law students should be acquainted
with the Bible, not to discuss Hoffman's Resolutions.244
Second, the article distinguishes between the amoral practice of
undertaking an "unjust cause" and the "extreme case" that "even
"conscience" in lawyers); David Dudley Field, The Study and Practice of the Law, 14 U.S.
DEM. REv. 345, 349 (1844) (noting actions that may affect the lawyer's "conscience").
236. Walker, supra note 11, at 547.
237. Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845).
238. The Practice of the Bar, supra note 11, at 241.
239. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 30. Infore conscientiae translates to "in the
tribune of his conscience." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979).
240. SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 23-24.
241. Id. at 40-43.
242. See generally Christianity in the Legal Profession, 27 S. LITERARY
MESSENGER 66 (1858) (reviewing BROWN, supra note 214).
243. Id. at 66.
244. Id. at 68.
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the guilty man should be defended." 245 The latter is proper not
only because it is a Christian action, but also because defending
the guilty client by the law repels the perfidy of lynch law. 24 6
Third, while rejecting Lord Brougham's view that a lawyer is
loyal to his client, even if such action would "involve his
country in confusion for his client's protection," 247 the author
generally defends the practice of law, including criminal law, as
"a high and honourable and Christian calling." 248 Fourth, the
author notes that the "extreme case" of the guilty client is
"usually put to the lawyer as a test of conscience. "249 In each of
these examples, conscience is an inner test of one's identity,
based on the individual's own standards, not society's. Hoffman
uses the word "conscience" just three times in his writing on
professional deportment, compared with the twenty-four uses of
"honor" or its variants. 250 As Bertram Wyatt-Brown notes about
the end of the ideal of honor in the mid-nineteenth century, "[i]n
moral terms, conscience replaced honor, guilt replaced shame,
that is, inner self-controls rather than public opinion were
supposed to govern how one acted." 25  This shift made
Hoffman of slight continuing interest to practicing lawyers, but
of little use when lawyers considered the bounds of the ethics of
advocacy.
Hoffman was fifty-one when the second edition of A
Course ofLegal Study was published. His final lecture had been
given over three years earlier, in 1833, and although listed as a
245. Id. at 70-72.
246. See id. at 71-72.
247. Christianity in the Legal Profession, supra note 242, at 70-71. As prince, and
before his arranged marriage to Queen Caroline, George IV had secretly and unlawfully
married a Catholic widow, Maria Fitzherbert. If the public had learned, George would
have forfeited his crown. In defending Queen Caroline against George's petition for a
divorce on the ground of adultery, Brougham implicitly threatened exposure of that fact by
stating, in part, "an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client." See 2 CAUSES CELEBRES: TRIAL OF QUEEN
CAROLINE 3 (New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1874). Brougham's views were officially
rejected by American lawyers until the development of the modern American legal
profession in the 1960s. See generally Michael Ariens, Brougham's Ghost, 35 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2015).
248. Christianity in the Legal Profession, supra note 241, at 71.
249. Id. at 72; see also BROOKE, supra note 12, at 14 ("[T]he question is, whether, in
such cases, a lawyer can, with a good conscience, prosecute the legal claim, directly
against the moral right.").
250. See generally 2 HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1836, supra note 4, at 744-75.
251. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 188, at 311.
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lawyer in the annual Baltimore Directory, his law practice was
moribund.252 What was worse for Hoffman's reputation was the
evanescent reaction to the second edition-only two reviews
were published. 25 3 The Boston-based American Jurist and Law
Magazine published a lengthy review of the second edition, but
the review spent merely the final paragraph on Hoffman's
Resolutions.2 54  The second significant review was in the
Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review. 255  Much of the
review was an extended digression on the value of study for
ministers in training. The remainder praised Hoffman's rules of
professional deportment but, instead of analyzing them, merely
quoted many resolutions favorably, including those in which
Hoffman refused to make a statute of limitations defense,
involve an infancy defense, or use the "artifices of eloquence" to
aid those of "atrocious character." 2 56
Hoffman's Miscellaneous Thoughts was published the next
year.257 The North American Review ostensibly reviewed it but
spent the bulk of its review praising the second edition of A
Course of Legal Study.258 The review, however, did not discuss
Hoffman's Resolutions, and the second edition received only a
cursory review. Hoffman's excuse was that the second edition
"was only very partially published."2 59
252. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 128; see also supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
253. All Hoffman received from the North American Review, which had published
Joseph Story's thirty-three page review of the first edition, was a simple notice of
publication alongside other books. See Quarterly List of New Publications, 43 N. AM.
REv. 283, 285 (1836). Unsurprisingly, the United States Magazine and Democratic
Review did not review the second edition.
254. See F.J.T, Hoffman's Course of Legal Study, 15 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 321,
341 (1836) (book review) (indicating delight with the resolutions and noting that "[u]pon a
future occasion we design to make this division the text for a separate article"). No such
article was ever published.
255. See generally Charles Hodge, Review, A Course of Legal Study, 9 BIBLICAL
REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REV. 509, 509-24 (1837).
256. Id. at 519-20.
257. See David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at 54.
258. See Critical Notices: Grumbler's Miscellaneous Thoughts, 45 N. AM. REv. 482,
482-84 (1837) (book review).
259. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE LEGAL STUDY OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO
STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY, at iii (Philadelphia, Thomas, Coperthwait &
Co. 2d ed. 1846) [hereinafter HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1846]. He made the same claim
in GRUMBLER, supra note 137, at 3.
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A Course of Legal Study was reprinted in 1846.260 The
same year, his book Hints on the Professional Deportment of
Lawyers ("Hints") was published, which reprinted Hoffman's
previous material on legal ethics. 26 1 By then, legal and literary
publishing had changed dramatically. The American Jurist and
Law Magazine and the Philadelphia-based American Law
Magazine no longer existed.262 Law journals that remained in
existence included the Monthly Law Reporter, published in
Boston, the Pennsylvania Law Journal and the Legal
Intelligencer, both published in Philadelphia, the Cincinnati-
based Western Law Journal, and the New York Legal
Observer.263  These journals provided practical advice to
practicing lawyers. None printed articles on broad
jurisprudential topics. 264  Whig-oriented publications, such as
the North American Review and the American Whig Review,
took no notice of the reprinted A Course of Legal Study or
Hints.2 65  In Miscellaneous Thoughts, the publisher listed
reviews of the second edition of A Course of Legal Study.266
After listing several positive French and English reviews, the
publisher wrote, "American notices of this second edition are
equally numerous and laudatory." 267  But these "numerous"
reviews consisted merely of mentions of the reviews listed
above, a brief review by the National Gazette, a reprinting in the
Baltimore American of the North American Review's final
paragraph, and a letter to the editor of the Baltimore American
commending the London Law Review's assessment.26 8  i
reality, it was a slender selection.
Michael Hoeflich traced the price of A Course of Legal
Study from the 1840s through 1860.269 He found its price
slightly declined over time, even in more remote parts of the
260. See HOFFMAN, LEGAL STUDY: 1846, supra note 259, at iii.
261. See David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at 55.
262. These periodicals were last published in 1843 and January 1846, respectively.
263. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 363.
264. See id
265. Id.
266. See GRUMBLER, supra note 137, at 7-11.
267. Id. at 8.
268. Id. at 8-11.
269. M. H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 65-67 (2010).
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nation.270  One reason for this decline was its "lost
popularity."2 7 1
In 1835, a British lawyer named Samuel Warren published
A Popular and Practical Introduction to Law Studies.272  A
second edition was published in 1845 and a third in 1863.273
The first American edition of Warren's book was published in
Philadelphia in 1836.274 Warren's emphasis on the "popular"
and the "practical" was a world away from Hoffman's
intellectually wide-ranging A Course of Legal Study. Warren's
Introduction became popular in the United States, eclipsing A
Course of Legal Study,275 and in 1848 Warren's book The
Moral, Social, and Professional Duties of Attornies and
Solicitors was published. 6 Hoffman was ignored by popular
magazines and professionally displaced by Warren.
As for Hoffman's Hints, it had no impact whatsoever. It
was neither reviewed in any legal publications nor in any of the
usual literary magazines. It just disappeared. In 1847, Hoffman
moved to England.277 He returned to the United States in 1854,
the year in which he died.278
Ill. LOST
A. Forgotten
Hoffman's influence waned because his views of
professional deportment represented the past.27 9 By the 1850s,
most lawyers who wrote about legal ethics rejected the centrality
of honor in favor of conscience, and conscience allowed a
270. Id.
271. Id. at 67.
272. See SAMUEL WARREN, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW
STUDIES (London, A. Maxwell 1835).
273. See C. R. B. Dunlop, Samuel Warren: A Victorian Law and Literature
Practitioner, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 265, 271 (2000).
274. See SAMUEL WARREN, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW
STUDIES (Philadelphia, J.S. Littell Ist Am. ed. 1836).
275. HOEFLICH, supra note 269, at 67 (stating the book "gained a wider audience in
the United States").
276. See SAMUEL WARREN, THE MORAL, SOCIAL, AND PROFESSIONAL DUTIES OF
ATTORNIES AND SOLICITORS (Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons 1848).
277. David Hoffman Time Line, supra note 104, at 55.
278. Id.
279. Dean Steve Sheppard thoughtfully suggested that Hoffman also faded because
his books lacked a proper institutional platform, and that his approach to law and legal
study was anachronistic.
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lawyer to bond more tightly, though not exclusively, with the
interests of his client.280 Lawyers sometimes justified this
change by citing Sharswood, as his views echoed those of most
other lawyers writing on the subject. 28 ' American lawyers
implicitly concluded Hoffman's Resolutions ill-fit for the times.
Sharswood was a life-long Philadelphian. 28 2  He was
appointed an associate judge of the district court in 1845 and
was named its presiding judge three years later. 283 In October
1850, he gave his first lecture as Professor at the newly
reinstituted Department of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania.284
In 1854, Sharswood began his law school lectures with a
focus on legal ethics. 285 This lecture became part of A Compend
of Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profession of Law,
published later that year.286 In addition to informing students
that a "[h]igh moral principle is [the young lawyer's] only safe
guide,"287 he cautioned his readers and listeners to beware that
"these objects of ambition, wealth, learning, honor, and
influence, worthy though they be, [are of but] factitious
importance." 288
Sharswood accepted the position that "the lawyer is not
merely the agent of the party; he is an officer of the court."289
Even so, the lawyer was "not morally responsible for the act of
the party in maintaining an unjust cause," for the lawyer's role
280. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 130.
281. See, e.g., Lawyer, His Character, supra note 235, at 195; Walker, supra note
11, at 547.
282. Joel Fishman, Sharswood, George, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 4, at 491, 491-92; see also Samuel Dickson, George
Sharswood, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 5, at 121, 132; Samuel Dickson,
George Sharswood-Teacher and Friend, 55 AM. L. REG. O.S. 401 (1907) (discussing
Sharswood's career as a law professor and his views on legal education). On the
Philadelphia bar of this time, see ROBERT R. BELL, THE PHILADELPHIA LAWYER: A
HISTORY, 1735-1945, at 106-56 (1992) and Gary B. Nash, The Philadelphia Bench and
Bar: 1800-1861, 7 J. COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 203 (1965).
283. Fishman, supra note 282, at 491.
284. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW 37 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1870).
285. See Edwin R. Keedy, George Sharswood-Professor ofLaw, 98 U. PA. L. REV.
685, 692 (1950).
286. See id.
287. SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 9.
288. Id. at 106.
289. Id. at 26.
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was to assist the court and jury in reaching its decision.290
Furthermore, "[t]he lawyer, who refuses his professional
assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and
indefensible, usurps the function of both judge and jury."29 1
These conclusions all ran contrary to Hoffman.
Sharswood believed it was the duty of the lawyer to plead
the statute of limitations on behalf of the client, even when the
client "knows that he honestly owes the debt sued for and that
the delay has been caused by indulgence or confidence on the
part of his creditor."292 Though the client "ought not to plead
the statute," if he wished to do so, the lawyer should raise it, and
the case would be decided on the law.293 Sharswood also
accepted the duty of the lawyer to represent the guilty client, for
such a person should be convicted only upon "legal
evidence." 294 The limits of the defense lawyer's representation
were as expressed in Courvoisier; "It is [the lawyer's] duty ...
to use ALL FAIR ARGUMENTS ARISING ON THE
EVIDENCE."295
Sharswood avoided canons, resolutions, rules, and the like.
His statement of high moral principle in the practice of law
remained in essay form. His acceptance of a greater, though not
exclusive, focus on the lawyer's duty of zealous representation
of his client fit the times and went well beyond Hoffman's
honor-based interpretation of the lawyer's duty to a client.296
For much of the latter half of the nineteenth century,




292. SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 25-26.
293. Id. at 26.
294. Id. at 31.
295. Id. at 44.
296. See generally Ariens, supra note 6 (discussing the duty and its related ethical
implications in detail). An appeal couched in very similar terms is found in John D.
Works, Open Letters: More About "Lawyers' Morals'"-The Responsibility of Laymen, 37
THE CENTURY MAG. 475, 475-76 (1889) ("But the distinction between legal and moral
right should not be overlooked.. . . For example, a debt may be barred by the statute of
limitations. The defendant who is sued is in a moral sense still liable, as the debt is unpaid;
but the statute of limitations having run, he has a legal defense which his attorney is bound,
as a matter of duty, to interpose for him.").
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B. Other Voices
A number of legal ethics essays, lectures, and printed
speeches from 1854 through the end of the nineteenth century
used Sharswood's Essay as their guide. Those that did not still
largely echoed Sharswood's views: (1) a lawyer representing a
client in a civil matter owed a duty to a client to use any proper
legal claim or defense, such as the statute of limitations or the
defense of infancy; and (2) a lawyer representing a person in a
criminal matter owed him the duty of zealous representation, for
no man should be convicted except upon legal evidence, and the
lawyer was "to suggest all those reasonable doubts which may
arise from the evidence as to his guilt, and to see that if he is
convicted, it is according to law." 29 7  This latter duty, while
breaking from Hoffman, did not extend as far as Lord
Brougham's view of zeal.298 When legal authors and speakers
looked for an ethical counterpoint with which they disagreed,
most used Brougham's speech in Queen Caroline's case. None
mentioned Hoffian's less ambitious understanding of honorable
zeal, and only a few advanced that position without naming
Hoffman.
For example, William Allen Butler's February 1871 speech
before a New York audience, 299 published later that year as
Lawyer and Client: Their Relation, Rights, and Duties ("Lawyer
and Client"), stated the following view adopted by most lawyers
of Brougham's speech: "This was a high and somewhat rapid
flight of oratory, far beyond any justifiable limit of duty or
privilege. ... It is rarely quoted, except to be condemned."3 00
Other postbellum writers echoed Butler's view. Henry
297. SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 25-27, 31.
298. See id at 28-29 (quoting and criticizing Brougham); see also WILLIAM P.
WELLS, THE CONDITIONS OF THE LAWYER'S USEFULNESS 10 (Ann Arbor, John Moore
1875) (rejecting the view that a lawyer is solely an agent of his client). The extent of the
shift in understanding of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to his client in the late nineteenth
century is contestable. Compare Ariens, supra note 6, at 394-407 (concluding that the shift
taking place in this period was driven by a focus upon the best interests of the client), with
Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors, 60 HARV. L. REV. 838,
840-41 (1947) (book review) (arguing that the legal profession became one in which
lawyers did whatever they could for their clients in order to gain wealth and power for
themselves). See generally Ariens, supra note 247.
299. See Local Miscellany, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 1871, at 8 (noting delivery of
third in series of lectures by Butler on "relations arising between lawyer and client").
300. WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, LAWYER AND CLIENT: THEIR RELATION, RIGHTS,
AND DUTIES 41-42 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1871).
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Sedgwick urged lawyers to "[f]orget the fallacious eloquence of
Brougham."301 Theodore Bacon summarized the consensus
view in 1888, stating, "I do not deem it important here to
controvert the extraordinary proposition enunciated by Lord
Brougham upon the trial of Queen Caroline.... [I]t has seldom
since been approvingly cited, unless by some advocate
maintaining an unconscionable cause by reprehensible
methods." 302
Late-nineteenth century lawyers implicitly and explicitly
followed Sharswood in supporting zealous representation on
"rule of law" grounds. Joseph Cox concluded that a lawyer who
believes his client is guilty maintains a duty to represent the
client by using the legal principles that properly apply, because
"[o]ur government is one of law." 303 This argument was echoed
the following year by John Works in a long letter to the editors
of The Century:
Very few thoughtful men, whether lawyers or not, will
at the present day contend that a lawyer violates any rules
of professional ethics or commits any wrong to society by
defending a criminal whom he knows to be guilty. To be
tried and defended by counsel, in open court, is a
constitutional right expressly guaranteed to every person
charged with a criminal offense. No one, whether his
attorney or not, has a right to assume his guilt. The law
presumes his innocence. If he is unable to employ an
301. HENRY D. SEDGWICK, THE RELATION AND DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE
STATE 16 (New York, Baker & Godwin 1872).
302. Theodore Bacon, Professional Ethics, 17 J. SOC. SCI. 37, 41 (1883); see also
DORMAN B. EATON, THE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DUTIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
22-23 (New Haven, Hodgson & Robinson 1882) ("No language can too strongly reprobate
so detestable and barbarous a code of professional ethics, more becoming a band of pirates
or brigands than a Christian officer of justice . . . ."); RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON
ADVOCACY INTENDED FOR PRACTITIONERS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS 163
(William L. Murfree, Sr., ed., St. Louis, William H. Stevenson 3d Amer. ed. 1884) ("Lord
Brougham's authority, however, on this point is very generally controverted."); HENRY
WADE ROGERS, ADDRESS TO THE LAW CLASS OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, JUNE 17,1886,
at 24 (n.p., 1886) ("[B]oth the judgment and the conscience of the profession reject the
extreme opinion which was expressed by Lord Brougham in Queen Caroline's case."). A
few late-nineteenth century writers considered the context of Brougham's speech, as did
Sharswood. Noting that Brougham was defending Queen Caroline in a divorce demanded
by King George IV, thus, "we imagine that his motive for advancing so extreme a theory
was to palliate, in the eyes of the King, the vehemence of his advocacy against the King, by
making it appear that he felt himself compelled thereto by his conceptions of an advocate's
duty." About the Profession and Practice of the Law, 1 S. L. REV. 249, 279 (1872).
303. Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 8 OHIO ST. B. ASS'N REP. 95, 105-06 (1888).
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attorney, the court must appoint one to conduct his defense.
The attorney has no legal or moral right to refuse to defend
him on the ground that he knows him to be guilty, whether
he is employed by the defendant or appointed by the court
to appear for him. This duty requires him to make the
defense for him fairly and justly, in the interest of society
as well as of the prisoner.3
Butler's Lawyer and Client exemplified the shift between
public honor and private conscience in thinking about how far
the lawyer is amenable for the conduct of his client's case.
Butler noted that the lawyer was required to act in accordance
with any rules of the court, and that he was subject to praise or
condemnation by the public as long as it properly understood the
case and avoided a decision based on mere passion.3 os "But the
lawyer is amenable, first of all and last of all and most of all, to
his own conscience. "306 Henry Wade Rogers urged the 1886
law graduates at the University of Michigan to avoid any
professional behavior that would "shock an enlightened
conscience. 307 He also cited Rufus Choate on the view that no
lawyer possessed a "duty to go into court, and contrary to his
convictions assert what he did not believe to be true." 308 in
discussing the distrust of lawyers among the public, including
"highly intelligent men," Richard Harris noted the argument was
"that several practices usual at the bar are contrary to good
conscience."309 This shift, however, was not unanimous. In an
304. Works, supra note 296, at 476; accord D. H. CHAMBERLAIN, SOME OF THE
PRESENT NEEDS AND DUTIES OF OUR PROFESSION 12, 14 (New York & London, G.P.
Putman's Sons 1888). The "rule of law" view was contrasted by those who facilitated the
rise of lynching in the postbellum period. See MICHAEL J. PFEIFER, ROUGH JUSTICE:
LYNCHING AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1874-1947, at 94 (2004) ("Lynching across the
postbellum United States underscored the difference between the criminal justice values
held by many rural and working-class people, who sought harsh retribution closely
supervised by the community, and those possessed by many middle-class people, who
stressed the role of the state as neutral guarantor of justice, the observance of the forms of
law, fairness, decorum, and humanitarian considerations.").
305. See BUTLER, supra note 300, at 57-59.
306. Id. at 64; see also Bacon, supra note 302, at 39 (worrying that "if a lawyer's
conscience or a lawyer's honesty comes to be a current jest," then the legal profession's
"moral debasement" will contaminate society as a whole); WM. E. CHANDLER, ADDRESS
BEFORE THE GRAFTON AND COOS BAR ASSOCIATION 13 (Concord, Republican Press
Ass'n 1888) (citing Butler in favor of a duty to "win victory ... by all means which stop
short of personal and professional dishonor").
307. ROGERS, supra note 302, at 23.
308. Id. at 24.
309. HARRIS, supra note 302, at 157.
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1882 speech, Theodore Bacon, after rejecting Brougham,
rejected Sharswood on the grounds of honor.310 Sharswood
believed a lawyer remained duty-bound to represent a client if,
after taking on the matter, the lawyer found "his ardor chilled by
dishonoring disclosures" of the client. 31 1 In such a case, Bacon
concluded Sharswood's belief that the lawyer was required to
continue representing the client was wrong."' Therefore, "a
case which honorable counsel ought not to undertake with a
knowledge of its character, and a case which, once undertaken,
turns out to be of such a character" cannot be distinguished.313
If the "lawyer of good repute" withdrew in such a case, any
adverse consequence would properly fall on the client, not the
lawyer.314 However, Bacon's use of honor was a minority view.
The editors of the Southern Law Review favorably quoted
Sharswood on why the lawyer's understanding of duty was not
contrary to the public's interest, because "[t]he lawyer ... is not
merely the agent of the party[;] he is an officer of the court. "315
Publicly, nearly all lawyers by 1900 agreed that the lawyer
zealously represented his client, but never acted solely as the
client's agent.316 The "hired gun" model was never promoted,
and was regularly denounced by the elite bar, even as lawyers
recognized that "pettifoggers" and "shysters" were willing to do
most anything for a client.317
310. See Bacon, supra note 302, at 43-44.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 44.
314. Id; see also GEORGE W. MCCRARY, THE TRUE LAWYER 10 (Kansas City, H.
N. Farey & Co. 1886) (following implicitly the approach of Sharswood and declaring it
took a trial to determine which side was right and which was wrong, but also speaking
repeatedly in terms of honor). A similar view is expressed in EATON, supra note 302, at 23
(quoting without citing Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson in Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa.
187, 189 (1845) for the proposition that "[t]he high and honorable office of Counsel would
be degraded to that of a mercenary, were he compelled to do the biddings of his client
against the dictates of his conscience").
315. About the Profession and Practice ofLaw, supra note 302, at 279.
316. This message was lost to some. See JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER 142 (1907) (rejecting Brougham's doctrine but concluding "yet it has been relied
on over and over again by lawyers, to cover all kinds of dishonest practices and defenses").
317. See CHARLES EDWARDS, PLEASANTRIES ABOUT COURTS AND LAWYERS OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 128 (New York, Richardson & Co. 1867) (noting judge, jury,
witnesses, and spectators were not "displeased that the old greasy pettifogger had the worst
of it"); HENRY W. WILLIAMS, LEGAL ETHICS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUNG COUNSEL
206 (1906) ("The needs of one's client can never relieve against crime. Such offences as
perjury, the corruption of jurors, of witnesses, and the abstraction of papers from the files,
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In all of the printed speeches and written articles
concerning the American legal profession from the 1860s
through 1900, none mentioned David Hoffman or his
Resolutions. He was simply not a part of any debate on
American legal ethics during that time.
C. Treatises on Ethics
The first treatise on legal ethics was written by Edward
Weeks and published in 1878.31 Though the treatise was a
lengthy 698 pages, one reviewer noted the absence of "much
information as to what things may be done by [an] attorney, and
what not, in criminal cases." 3 19  Weeks's Treatise cited
Sharswood three times, and Hoffman not at all.320 It followed
their general view that the lawyer was not merely an agent of the
client, but rather "a client has no right to control his attorney in
the due and orderly conduct of a suit; and it is his duty to do
what the court would order to be done, though his client instruct
him otherwise." 32 1 A second edition, published in 1892, also
ignored both Hoffman and the issue of what may be done by a
criminal defense attorney.322
George Warvelle's 1902 treatise looked closely at the
duties owed by the lawyer to his client, opposing parties, the
which are too frequently committed and which are sometimes connived at by a certain
class of practitioners, cannot be defended on such grounds, either before the law or in
morals."). Published in 1906, Williams wrote in the late-nineteenth century. See CAIT
MURPHY, SCOUNDRELS IN LAW: THE TRIALS OF HOWE & HUMMEL, LAWYERS TO THE
GANGSTERS, COPs, STARLETS, AND RAKES WHO MADE THE GILDED AGE (2010)
(discussing the law firm of Howe and Hummel and its use of the methods noted by
Williams); RICHARD H. ROVERE, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND SCANDALOUS
HISTORY (1947) (further detailing the win-at-all costs mentality of the notorious law firm);
see also JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 141
(2011) (noting Darrow's defense of lawyers charged with bribing jurors in 1906 and
quoting a former law partner that, in some personal-injury cases in which Darrow
represented plaintiffs, "[iut was bribery all around").
318. See generally EDWARD P. WEEKS, TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELLORS AT LAW (San Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co. 1878).
319. Book Notices: Weeks's Treatise on Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, 13 AM.
L. REv. 358, 359 (1879) (book review).
320. See WEEKS, supra note 318, at 54, 693, 716.
321. Id. at 50.
322. The preface to this edition states that the treatise was revised only to the extent
required by changes in the law affecting the treatise's accuracy. CHARLES THEODORE
BOONE, TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW, at iv (San Francisco,
Bancroft-Whitney Co. 2d ed. 1892).
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court, and society.323 In general, the duty was based on the
interiority of conscience, not honor accorded by others. Ethical
behavior "should be guided in a general way by recognized
usages, the prevailing moral sentiment, and the suggestions of
[the lawyer's] own conscience." 324  Warvelle specifically
addressed the problem of the lawyer's knowledge of his client's
guilt, accepted the consensus view, and concluded by endorsing
the prevailing sentiment from Courvoisier.3 25  Similarly,
Warvelle followed Sharswood on using the defense of the
statute of limitations, acknowledging that a lawyer "is under a
duty to urge it in a suit brought to recover [a] debt." 326 Finally,
Warvelle included a favorable summary of the actions of
Phillips in Courvoisier.327
Hoffman's Resolutions was reprinted several times in the
first two decades of the twentieth century, initially by the
American Bar Association in 1907, and subsequently in a few
treatises and casebooks.328 Unfortunately, no reprint looked
critically at the substance of Hoffman's Resolutions. It was
simply published without comment. In general, that is about all
one heard about Hoffman during the first seven decades of the
twentieth century.
IV. FOUND
A. The Code of Professional Responsibility and Crisis in
the American Legal Profession
Just three years after its adoption by the ABA, the 1969
Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted as law by
forty-three states and the District of Columbia. 32 9 Four other
state bar associations made the Code applicable to its members,
323. See generally GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS (1902).
324. Id. at 35.
325. The lawyer may "use all fair arguments that may arise from the trial." Id. at
136.
326. Id. at 160.
327. Id. at 211-16.
328. See Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 A.B.A. REP.
676, app. H at 717-35 (1907); Hoffnan's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 230, 230-38 (1908); GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETHICAL
OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER, app. at 317-42 (1910); GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, JR., CASES
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS, app. at 555-69 (William R. Vance ed. 1917).
329. Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 740-41 (1972).
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while the remaining three states had not yet adopted it.330 Canon
7, one of the nine Canons comprising the Code, was entitled: "A
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds
of the Law." 331 This conclusion was justified on standard rule of
law grounds. Any other approach would allow the public to
determine whether an unpopular cause or client would find
representation, and only full representation of the parties
allowed the case to be decided on informed and dispassionate
grounds.332 Despite its extraordinary popularity, the Code was
attacked early and often. An ABA Journal essay, revealingly
titled The Myth of Legal Ethics, stated, "The Code of
Professional Responsibility, as the Canons of Professional
Ethics before it, is a treasure trove of moral platitudes." 333 Even
a sympathetic reader found the Code "repeatedly biased in the
ordering of its priorities." 334 These criticisms were a part of a
larger crisis within the American legal profession.
In the preface to Unequal Justice, Jerold Auerbach wrote
that the period between 1968 and 1974 were "terrible years."335
Auerbach noted this period "was coming apart as legitimate
authority was stripped from one institution after another-from
university, government, presidency, military, police, prisons,
courts, [and] law." 336
By early 1973, over two dozen lawyers were enmeshed in
the Watergate scandal.337 In 1974, the Department of Justice
concluded several provisions of the Code violated antitrust
330. Id.
331. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969).
332. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94
A.B.A. REP. 729, 774 (1969) [hereinafter Ethical Standards].
333. Eric Schnapper, The Myth ofLegal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202, 203 (1978).
334. Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REv. 702, 704 (1977).
335. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA, at xii (1976). For a detailed discussion of those terrible years, see
Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modem Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST. MARY'S J. ON
MALPRACTICE & LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2014).
336. AUERBACH, supra note 335, at xii (internal quotation marks omitted).
Auerbach is likely referencing WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's (1971).
337. LIEBERMAN, supra note 16, at 35. See generally JOHN J. SIRICA, TO SET THE
RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON (1979)
(a first-hand account of Judge John Sirica's role in the Watergate scandal); KEN GORMLEY,




laws, 38 and the next year the Supreme Court held that minimum
fee schedules violated the Sherman Act.339 Shortly thereafter,
the Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against the
ABA because the Code wholly banned lawyer advertising, 34 0
and in 1977, the Court held Arizona's ban on all lawyer
advertising violated the First Amendment. 34 1 At the same time,
many lawyers also found themselves victims of economic
turmoil.3 42
The special committee drafting the Code intended it serve
two functions: "The Code of Professional Responsibility points
the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge
the transgressor." 343  For "aspiring" lawyers the Code offered
"Ethical Considerations." For less ethical lawyers, it provided
"Disciplinary Rules". 344  Both the Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules were subordinate to the Code's nine
"axiomatic" Canons. By mid-1977, the decision to include both
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules was directly
attacked. L. Ray Patterson, then Dean of Emory University Law
School, wrote in the ABA Journal, "[t]he time has come to
renounce completely the fiction that ethical problems for
lawyers are matters of ethics rather than law. The fiction
pervades the Code of Professional Responsibility and is its
major shortcoming." 345
338. See Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Services Plans Get
an Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A. J. 791, 791-93 (1974); Justice
Department Continues Its Contentions That the Houston Amendments Raise Serious
Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A. J. 1410, 1410-14 (1974).
339. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784-85, 793 (1975).
340. See Lawrence E. Walsh, The Annual Report of the President of the American
Bar Association, 62 A.B.A. J. 1119, 1120 (1976); Justice Department Charges Code
Advertising Provisions Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, 62 A.B.A. J. 979, 979 (1976).
341. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
342. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 67 (1995) ("[T]he price of legal
services fell (in real, that is, inflation-adjusted, terms), rather than . . . rose, between 1970
and 1985."); see also Richard H. Sander & E.Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many
Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & SOC. INQuIRY 431, 448 tbl. 9
(1989) (noting that in constant 1983 dollars, median lawyer income fell from $47,638 in
1970 to $36,716 in 1980).
343. Ethical Standards, supra note 332, at 731.
344. Id. at 731-32.
345. Patterson, supra note 17, at 639.
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B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA created a Special Committee on the Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1977.346 The committee
broadened its mandate by deciding to write what became the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It became the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, also
known as the Kutak Commission after its chair, Robert Kutak.347
The Kutak Commission eliminated aspiring Ethical
Considerations in favor of the view of ethics problems as
problems of law.348 In reference to this change, Kutak wrote in
1983, "[w]hat lawyers . .. have failed to appreciate is that ethics
is not what the Model Rules concern; the Model Rules are about
the law of lawyering." 349
In the three years between the publication of the Discussion
Draft and the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules,
commentators engaged in strenuous debate over the extent of the
lawyer's duty to a client.350  This particularly arose in the
context of the lawyer's duty to protect client information. 35 1
Model Rule 1.7 of the Discussion Draft, dated January 30, 1980,
included in two instances in which a lawyer "shall" disclose
information about a client, and four cases which the lawyer
"may" but is not required to do so. 35 2
This provision in the Discussion Draft was attacked by
various critics.35 3  The Proposed Final Draft of the Kutak
346. See Report to the Board of Governors to the House of Delegates, 102 A.B.A.
REP. 575, 581 (1977).
347. Informational Report of the Board of Governors to the House of Delegates, 103
A.B.A. REP. 640, 646 (1978); Robert J. Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22 WASHBURN L.J.
413, 413 (1983); Stephen E. Kalish, David Hoffman's Essay on Professional Deportment
and the Current Legal Ethics Debate, 61 NEB. L. REV. 54, 55 (1981).
348. See Kalish, supra note 347, at 58.
349. Kutak, supra note 347, at 413.
350. See Kalish, supra note 347, at 56 (noting an attack by the Roscoe Pound-
American Trial Lawyers Foundation).
351. See id.
352. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980).
353. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U.
MIAMi L. REV. 739, 746 (1981); Editorial A License to Squeal?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1980, at 20. The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation offered an alternate
Code proposing more stringent limits on disclosing client confidences. See Commission on
Professional Responsibility of The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer's Foundation,
The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct Public Discussion Draft-June 1980, TRIAL, Aug.
1980, at 44, 50.
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Commission, released in May 1981, re-wrote the provision on
the lawyer's duty to keep a client's confidences. 354  The
Commission altered Rule 1.6 by removing all requirements of a
lawyer to disclose a client confidence. 355
The Model Rules displaced the view that ethical rules were
"matters of personal conscience" by generating a "law of
lawyering," leading to legal ethics being understood as positive
law. 356 The Model Rules generally favored a lawyer's duty of
loyalty to a client over the lawyer's duty as an "officer of the
court." 357  Hoffinan became a source for those attacking the
liberal role morality of lawyers, found in both the Code and the
Rules, by reviving an ethics of virtue, which such critics equated
with Hoffman.
C. The Revival of David Hoffman
Beginning in the late 1970s, as the ABA moved to supplant
the Code with its Model Rules, Hoffman's legal ethics became
the subject of law review articles, particularly on a lawyer's duty
to society as well as to his client.358 Professor Stephen Kalish's
commentary on the proposed Model Rules examined Hoffman's
Resolutions and argued in support of the "officer of the court"
concept. 359 L. Ray Patterson's 1980 article, Legal Ethics, used
Hoffman and Sharswood to argue for a lawyer-client
relationship that went beyond an agency relationship, to what he
called a "reciprocal agency theory," which accepted the concept
354. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
355. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft
1981), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980). This
provision was only slightly modified further in the Proposed Final Draft. See Report of the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A. REP. 828, 833, 846-47
(1982) (reprinting Proposed Final Draft as Exhibit H).
356. Kalish, supra note 347, at 57.
357. The initial drafts of the Model Rules were more balanced regarding the
lawyer's duty of loyalty to a client and her duty as an officer of the court than the final
version approved by the ABA. See generally Ariens, supra note 335 (discussing changes
in Model Rules from "working draft" to version approved in 1983).
358. See generally Bloomfield, Legal Culture, supra note 3; L. Ray Patterson, Legal
Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty ofLoyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 912-13 (1980); Kalish, supra
note 347.
359. Kalish, supra note 347, at 58-59.
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that the lawyer's duty of loyalty to a client did not override the
lawyer's duty as an officer of the court.360
Another important contributor to the revival of David
Hoffman was Professor Thomas Shaffer. Shaffer first discussed
Hoffman's legal ethics in his book On Being a Christian and a
Lawyer.36 1 Published in the midst of the ABA's tortuous debate
on the Model Rules, this book was a corrective intended in part
to refute the idea that legal ethics was merely a type of law. The
book discusses the issue of "role" in the behavior of lawyers and
clients and the relationship between role and morality. As
Shaffer and Professor Robert Cochran wrote elsewhere:
Our purposes . . . are to seek out and examine the moral
standards clients and their lawyers bring to the law office,
to hold those standards up as better than the minimum
lawyer standards, and to identify a way that lawyers and
clients can talk about and apply their standards in the law
office on ordinary Wednesday afternoons."362
Shaffer's evaluation of Hoffman was neither to venerate nor to
argue for Hoffman's ethical views. He instead sought to
examine critically Hoffman's ideas in light of the dominant view
that lawyers zealously represented clients. Shaffer accurately
perceived Hoffman as ignoring any role of client conscience in
the practice of law. In contrast, modem adversary ethics largely
ignored any moral claims made by lawyers in representing
clients. The legal profession was thus stuck between the
radically incomplete views that the role of lawyer was solely as
360. See Patterson, supra note 358, at 916-17. Hoffman re-emerged as historians
considered the relation of republicanism and virtue in the founding and early national
periods. Maxwell Bloomfield was trained in both history and law, and his essay on
Hoffman considered the subject in light of republican ideas. See generally Bloomfield,
supra note 3. For a historiography of republicanism, see Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a
Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American
Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY QTRLY. 49 (1972), modified in Robert E. Shalhope,
Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY QTRLY. 334 (1982),
and Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11
(1992). I am deeply grateful to Dan Blinka for pointing out this chronological
convergence.
361. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER
(1981) (discussing Hoffman's legal ethics, particularly in the chapter titled "The Problem
of Representing the Guilty").
362. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 19, at vi (footnotes omitted).
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"agent" of or "godfather" to the client.36 3 Shaffer provides an
incisive assessment of both Hoffman and Sharswood,
concluding, "[i]t is fair to say that modem standards would not
admit of Sharswood's distinctions or Hoffman's reservations" in
defending a guilty client.364 Shaffer accepts the modem
approach to defending the guilty, but rejects its justifications.
After writing about Hoffman's legal lectures in 1982,
Shaffer published an essay titled The Gentleman in Professional
Ethics in 1984.365 Though Hoffman is referred to only
tangentially, Shaffer's essay is a deeply knowledgeable study of
the fatal flaws of the ethic of the gentleman, of whom Hoffman
was the paradigmatic example. Shaffer also assessed Hoffman's
Resolutions in his textbook American Legal Ethics, in an attempt
to persuade students to think about the everyday moral work of
lawyers rather than the boundaries of law enacted in the Model
Rules.366
Yale law professor Geoffrey Hazard co-authored The Law
of Lawyering.367 In a 1978 book, he previously reported the
critical comments of large-firm lawyers that the Code was an
outdated relic. 3 68  Hazard also served as the Reporter for the
Model Rules.369 In a 1981 article defending the drafting
process, Hazard explained the Commission's rejection of the
tripartite structure of the Code in favor of rules, called the Code
"anachronistic," and concluded that Hoffman and Sharswood's
"ethical guidance consisted of Victorian moralizing at its
worst."370 He explained that the "beginning point for the Kutak
363. Shaffer and Cochran delineated four approaches to moral issues in representing
clients: (1) lawyer as godfather; (2) lawyer as hired gun; (3) lawyer as guru; and (4) lawyer
as friend. Id at 3-4.
364. SHAFFER, supra note 361, at 68.
365. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10
QUEEN'S L.J. 1 (1984).
366. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION Topics, at xxv-xxvi (1985).
367. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985).
368. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7 (1978).
369. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 RECORD
B. ASS'N CITY OF N.Y. 77, 77 n. * (1981).
370. Id. at 80-82. Hazard wrongly dates Hoffman's "ethical precepts" as from 1817.
Id. at 80. Even if he correctly used 1836, this still predates Queen Victoria's reign. And
even allowing for some chronological leeway, Hazard is simply wrong to declare
Hoffman's or Sharswood's views "Victorian," unless the only meanings he attributes to it
are "old-fashioned" or "views I disagree with."
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Commission [was] that adversarial representation of clients is in
the public interest."371 This last assertion was irrelevant. Earlier
writers promoted adversarial representation as in the public
interest. 2 That is why nearly all nineteenth-century lawyers
used the word "zeal" and justified defending the guilty client on
rule of law or anti-lynching grounds. The relevant question was
when, if ever, does a lawyer's duty as an "officer of the court"
override the lawyer's duty to zealously represent the client? The
Model Rules provided an answer-rarely.
Hazard distilled the recent historical movement in legal
ethics in his article The Future ofLegal Ethics.373 He concluded
legal ethics were "norms [that] have become legalized." 374
Professor Hazard continued, "[t]he rules of ethics have ceased to
be internal to the profession; they have instead become a code of
public law enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary
process[es]."375
D. The Professionalism Crisis
Hazard was right. Legal ethics were a matter of law, and
lawyers began seeking its boundaries. By 1980, "[t]he
prevailing notion among lawyers seem[ed] to be that the
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client [was] the first, the
foremost, and, on occasion, the only duty of the lawyer." 376
371. Id. at 93.
372. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers'
Advocacy?, in 2 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, MEDICINE 31, 31-33
(1976).
373. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE
L.J. 1239 (1991).
374. Id. at 1241 (internal quotations omitted).
375. Id; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J.
447, 453 (1995) ("'Law' and 'morals' are thus at opposite ends of the normative spectrum
in terms of form, mutual intelligibility, and as mechanisms of personal and social action.
In between law and morals are 'ethics."'); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Legal
Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 239, 244 (1998)
(noting "traditional understanding" of the legal profession that lawyer conduct norms were
rules of ethics rather than law). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Douglas W. Pinto, Jr.,
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW: FAITH, VIRTUE, AND MORES 179 (2013)
(concluding, "[w]e yearn for latter-day Jethroes: 'Able people such as fear God, people of
truth, hating covetousness"'). For a thorough study, see Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a
History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 469 (2001), and Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization
ofAmerican Legal Ethics-II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (2002).
376. Patterson, supra note 358, at 918.
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Several critics urged that lawyers seek an ethic of justice, one
that differed from "a professional vision based only on client
service and the bottom line." 377 The liberal conception was that
an autonomous client selected his legal goals, which the lawyer
then worked to effectuate. In this liberal view, lawyers were
thus not accountable to the public for the goals of their clients, a
view accepted in both Canon 7 of the Code and in the Model
Rules. Those promoting an ethics of virtue found the moral
nonaccountability of lawyers a fatally flawed understanding of
legal ethics. 378 Hoffman's Resolutions served as a contrary view
of legal ethics, one founded in virtue.379
In the last half of the 1980s, the problem of the "moral
nonaccountability" of lawyers became acute, as some in the
profession reacted to perceived adversarial excesses. Just a year
after the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA created a
Commission on Professionalism to combat the possibility that
"the Bar might be moving away from the principles of
professionalism and that it was so perceived by the public."380
In 1986, the Commission issued a report discussing the
extensive changes to the legal profession since 1960.381 The
creation of more formal disciplinary processes resulted in
lawyers taking "the rules more seriously" than before. 382 But
the move from the Code to the Rules also resulted in a tendency
of lawyers "to look at nothing but the rules." 383 The House of
Delegates resolved to distribute this report to law schools,judges, and state and local bar associations. This kicked off the
"professionalism crusade." 384
Two years later, the Commission on Professionalism
resolved that it recommend to state and local bar associations
that they adopt a lawyers' creed of professionalism to battle
377. LUBAN, supra note 19, at xvii-xviii.
378. See, e.g., id. at xx.
379. HOFFMAN, supra note 136, at 24-25.
380. Report of the Commission on Professionalism, Ill A.B.A. REP. NO. 2, at 369,
373 (1986).
381. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, "... In the Spirit of Public Service:" A
Blueprint for the Rekindling ofLavyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 254 (1986).
382. Id. at 259; see also Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark's Legacy in the
Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 37 (2004-2005) (discussing history of reform
of lawyer disciplinary processes beginning with ABA's Clark Report).
383. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, supra note 381, at 259.
384. For a critical review, see Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the
Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995).
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"abuses ... fostered by excessive zeal, a win at any cost
mentality, scorched earth tactics, and the apotheosizing of
playing hard ball." 385  When it so resolved, the House of
Delegates added a second resolution that stated the following:
"That nothing contained in such a creed shall be deemed to
supersede or in any way amend the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct or other disciplinary codes, alter existing standards of
conduct against which lawyer negligence might be judged or
become a basis for the imposition of civil liability of any
kind."386 The second resolution ensured that the lawyer's creed
of professionalism was not an admonition to lawyers to "behave,
or else." Instead, it was aspirational, just as the rejected Ethical
Considerations of the 1969 Code were aspirational. That the
ABA was reviving an approach it had killed less than a decade
earlier did not appear confounding to it. The rules remained the
rules. Like other creeds, the lawyer's creed was made for
believers, and was a matter of no concern to unbelievers. Unlike
other creeds, it was difficult to discern how lawyers could use it
to proselytize their fellow brothers and sisters of the bar.
Some states tried to avoid the problem of faith by making
professionalism a rule. In 2008, Arizona defined
"unprofessional conduct" as "substantial or repeated violations
of the Oath of Admission to the Bar or the Lawyer's Creed of
Professionalism of the State Bar of Arizona," making such
conduct subject to discipline.m3 1 In 2013, the Florida Supreme
Court adopted a Code for Resolving Professionalism
Complaints, and followed Arizona in defining "unprofessional
conduct" as "substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of
Admission to The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of
Professionalism, The Florida Bar Ideals and Goals of
Professionalism, The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, or the
decisions of The Florida Supreme Court."388 Thus, in those
385. Report No. 2 of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, 113 A.B.A. REP.
No. 2, at 589, 589 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
386. Proceedings of the 1988 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 113 A.B.A.
REP. No. 2, at 4, 25 (1988).
387. ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 31 (West 2014); see also Amelia Craig Cramer et al., Civility
for Arizona Lawyers: Essential, Endangered, Enforceable, 6 PHX. L. REV. 465, 482 (2012)
(detailing the history of the amendment).




states the law of lawyering now encompasses the
Professionalism Creed.
A 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
intended "to deal with the abuses that undermined civility and
professionalism," instead "may have contributed to further
undermining the public's confidence in the profession as
well." 389 The goal of amended Rule 11 was to inculcate civility
in civil litigation. Its unintended consequence was "a
deleterious effect on lawyer relations." 390  Concomitantly, the
1980s also saw a rise in efforts to disqualify opposing counsel
on conflict-of-interest grounds. In his 1986 treatise Modern
Legal Ethics, Charles Wolfram wrote, "[t]he motion for a
judicial order disqualifying a lawyer in pending litigation
because of conflict is a traditional remedy that has come into
prominence in recent years." 391 In Texas, for example, appellate
decisions on orders disqualifying counsel on conflict-of-interest
grounds were first issued in the late 1980s. 392 By the end of the
1980s, lawyers began to write ruefully about the deleterious
consequences of "Rambo-style" litigation tactics to the
profession of law. While some of these tactics might violate
enforceable rules, others simply made litigation even more
onerous and expensive, heightening the professionalism crisis.393
In 1988, the Section on Professional Responsibility of the
Association of American Law Schools organized its annual
program around professionalism, 394 and the American Bar
389. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 589, 590
(1998). See generally Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A
Historical Perspective, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 381 (2012) (discussing the history of
ethics in civil litigation).
390. Vairo, supra note 389, at 627.
391. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.7 (2d ed. 1985). See
generally Charles W. Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677
(1997) (citing cases largely dating from the 1980s or later).
392. See NCNB Tex. Nat'1 Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 399-400 (Tex. 1989);
Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. App. 1988).
393. See Curtin, supra note 19, at 8; Paul Marcotte, Reining in Rambo, 75 A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1989, at 43, 43; Thomas J. Paprocki, Ethics in the Everyday Practice of Law, 35
CATH. LAW. 169, 171 (1991); Reavley, supra note 19, at 646; Sayler, supra note 19, at 79-
81; Bradley W. Foster, Comment, Playing Hardball in Federal Court: Judicial Attempts to
Referee Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 223, 224 (1989).
394. See Atkinson, supra note 384, at 261 n.4.
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Foundation held a conference on the subject.395 Courts and bar
associations also focused on professionalism.396 The
professionalism crisis resulted in a flood of books 397 and
articles3 98 alternately regretting or fearing the shift of law from a
profession to a business.3 99 And at least 140 state or local bar
associations adopted some professionalism creed between 1986
and 2007.400
In this maelstrom, David Hoffman has served a purpose.
He is a reminder of a past in which ethics and morality were
intertwined, and both served the idea of law as a profession. He
also represented a past ideal of virtue ethics, in contrast to the
role morality of modern liberal legal ethics. Hoffman's ethos
was of less interest to legal scholars than the fact that Hoffman
served as a symbol of a worthy tradition. Legal scholars often
referred to his Resolutions from the 1980s on, but ordinarily to
support an argument about a smaller or larger aspect of
unprofessional lawyer behavior, or about the moral qualities to
be fostered in American lawyers. Hoffman was used
instrumentally by those who often argued on non-instrumental
grounds for a return to a moral "golden age" on the past. On
these grounds, the law of lawyering won both the battle and the
war.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate on the Model Code continues, though the ABA,
through its Ethics 2000 Commission and later efforts, has
395. See LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, at ix (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). This September
1988 Conference led to the book.
396. See Philip A. Lacovara, Lawyers and Professionalism, 3 WASH. LAWYER 6,6-7
(1988).
397. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING
AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
398. See, e.g., Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profession, 45 S.C.
L. REv. 883 (1994); Professionalism in the Practice of Law: A Symposium on Civility and
Judicial Ethics in the 1990s, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513 (1994).
399. Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 911
(1996) ("The legal profession is dead or dying. It is rotting away into an occupation.").
400. Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be Civil: Defining




largely nibbled around the corners. 4 0 1 Inculcating virtuous
conduct within the American legal profession also continues, but
again only in a small, incremental fashion. The professionalism
debate is never-ending, though it is now considered in light of
the impact of the Great Recession on the American legal
profession. A profession constantly in crisiS40 2 faces another-
what is it, and what is it to be; or rather, what are lawyers to be,
for the future may be several discrete professions, a pluralistic
society of lawyers,
One possibly surprising lesson to take from Hoffman's life
is to reject "declinist" thought. Hoffman's fear of the rabble and
Jacksonian democracy, as well as personal loss, led him from
the legal profession. That fear may also have led to his
insistence on arguing in some of his Resolutions for a lawyering
tradition that never was, one based on a professional exclusivity
that was quickly disappearing. Changes in the modern
American legal profession may result in decline, but such a
result is not fated.403
It may be that "[t]hings fall apart; the centre cannot
hold." 404  Transformations of the legal profession have been
taking place for more than four decades, 0 5 and predictions of
major transformations "within the next decade or so" 406 are
simply a reminder that instability is a constant for lawyers.
401. See Ariens, supra note 18, at 295-300 (listing notable events from 1997-2008).
402. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal
Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note
395, at 144, 144-45.
403. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER
(2010) (discussing the ebb-and-flow nature of the legal profession).
404. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS:
POETRY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 42, 42 (Jonathan Allison ed. 2002).
405. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 444-51 (discussing end of "golden age" and rise of
professional anxiety since 1970).
406. MORGAN, supra note 403, at 217.
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